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Abstract
A manager who learns privately about a project over time may want to delay quitting
it if recognizing failure/lack of success hurts his reputation. In the banking industry,
managers may want to roll over bad loans. How do distortions depend on expected
project quality? What are the effects of releasing public information about quality? A
key feature of banks is that they learn about project quality from bad news, i.e. a default.
We show that in such an environment, distortions tend to increase with expected quality
and imperfect information about quality. Results differ if managers instead learn from
good news.
∗We thank Simon Board, Patrick Bolton, Tri Vi Dang, Peter DeMarzo, Wouter Dessein, Marco Di Maggio,
Brett Green, Zhiguo He, Matt Jackson, Navin Kartik, Avi Lichtig, Qingmin Liu, Matteo Maggiori, George
Mailath, Konrad Mierendorff, Pauli Murto, Andrea Prat, Canice Prendergast, Andy Skrzypacz, Lars Stole,
Phillip Strack, various seminar and conference audiences, and two anonymous referees for helpful comments.
We also thank Johannes Ho¨rner, Paul Milgrom, Dan Quint, and Curt Taylor for valuable discussions of the
paper. Yifeng Guo provided excellent research assistance.
†Yale University and CEPR. Email: marina.halac@yale.edu.
‡The Hebrew University and University of Warwick. Email: ikremer@huji.ac.il.
When a manager learns privately about a project over time, the market cannot assess the
full consequences of his behavior, and the manager may want to take suboptimal actions that
make a better impression (e.g., Prendergast and Stole, 1996). In particular, a manager may
want to delay quitting a project if recognizing failure/lack of success hurts his reputation.
How do distortions depend on expected project quality? Are managers more likely to keep
bad ventures during good times, when expected quality is higher? What are the effects of
releasing public information about project quality?
Following the financial crises over the last 30 years, there has been a growing concern
about banks’ behavior during boom times. It is by now well documented that financial crises
have often been preceded by credit booms (e.g., Schularick and Taylor, 2012). One reason
for unhealthy credit growth is that banks may lower their standards and lend to low-quality
borrowers who are unlikely to repay in a downturn. But there is also another reason for
concern: during good times, banks may prefer not to force bankruptcy and instead roll over
bad debt, providing life support to projects that, from an economic point of view, should be
terminated. This practice of rolling over bad loans indeed appears to have played an important
role in many crises, including Japan’s in the early 90s,1 and is at the center of current concerns
about China. According to The Wall Street Journal (2013), “the reason China’s bad-debt levels
are so low boils down to the tendency of the country’s banks to routinely extend or restructure
loans to borrowers, or sell them, rather than admit they have gone bad and record a loss in
their accounts.”2 These problems have prompted efforts in several countries to generate more
information about banks’ assets, for example by adopting stress testing and requiring public
disclosure of test results (e.g., Hirtle and Lehnert, 2014).
In a seminal paper, Rajan (1994) finds evidence of banks rolling over bad debt in good times
and proposes a simple static model of career concerns to explain bank managers’ incentives.
The pattern of distortions in a richer setting, however, is not obvious. On the one hand,
as Rajan (1994) points out, a bank’s reputation cost of recognizing bad debt is larger in
good times, when the perceived quality of loans is higher, compared to bad times. On the
other hand, the fraction of problematic loans is also smaller in good times, so the potential for
distortions is lower. The effects of releasing information are also a priori unclear: perfect public
1Sekine, Kobayashi and Saita (2003) and Peek and Rosengren (2005) find evidence that banks in Japan
continued to lend to severely impaired borrowers in order to avoid realizing losses on their own balance sheets.
See also Caballero, Hoshi and Kashyap (2008).
2The article shows that while China had a low nonperforming loan ratio in 2012 compared to other countries,
its nonperforming loans in billions of yuan were steadily increasing over 2011-2013. According to The Economist
(2014), “a culture of bankruptcy should replace the lifelines and ‘evergreening’ of useless loans” for China not
to “repeat Japan’s malaise.” Evaluating credit growth in China a year later, The Economist (2015) reports
that “it is not hard to find examples of companies on life support that in other countries might have perished
by now.”
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information about loan quality would eliminate any scope for distortions, but is imperfect
information also beneficial? We develop a dynamic model of career concerns to examine the
pattern of distortions and the value of information. Our dynamic framework reveals that
the nature of information managers receive over time is important for understanding these
issues. Specifically, a key factor in the banking industry is that managers learn about project
quality from the arrival of “bad news”: the structure of debt contracts implies that banks get
more information when a borrower is in distress and defaults than when the loan is paid in
full.3 This contrasts, for example, with the case of an entrepreneur investing in a technological
innovation, who learns from the good news that arrive when a breakthrough occurs.
In our model, a manager decides at each time whether to continue to invest in a given
project or abandon it. The quality of the project can be either good or bad and is initially
unknown to all parties. The manager cares not only about the payoffs from the project but
also about the market’s perception of the project’s quality. The market’s perception is based
on the publicly observable actions of the manager, namely whether he continues or not with
the project. The manager learns about the project’s quality from privately observed lump sum
payoffs that arrive at random times. We contrast two scenarios. Our main focus is on a bad
news setting, where the manager learns from the arrival of a negative payoff that indicates
that the project is bad (and thus expected to generate losses). Here “no news is good news”:
over time, in the absence of a negative payoff, the manager becomes more optimistic about the
quality of the project. As a benchmark we examine a good news setting, where the manager
learns from the arrival of a positive payoff that indicates that the project is good (and thus
expected to generate positive profits). In this case “no news is bad news”: the manager
becomes more pessimistic as time passes and a positive payoff does not arrive.
We characterize the manager’s decision of whether and when to abandon the project, and
how in turn the market updates its belief over time. In both of the information environments
we study, we solve for the (essentially) unique equilibrium in closed form.4 We show that the
manager’s career concern generates an inefficiency: the manager runs the project for too long
relative to the first-best solution that maximizes the expected payoff from the project. In the
setting in which learning about project quality is through the arrival of bad news, the manager
follows a pure strategy: he abandons the project if and only if bad news arrive before a given
date t∗. As the manager continues with the project before reaching t∗, the market’s belief that
the project is good increases; beyond t∗, the reputation cost of quitting is so large that the
manager prefers to continue with the project even when he knows it will generate losses. In
3As Townsend (1979) and Dang, Gorton and Holmstro¨m (2015a,b) argue, debt contracts enable banks to
minimize the cost of monitoring by not acquiring information when there is no default.
4Section 1 defines our equilibrium concept. We use a refinement in the same spirit as Divinity.
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the good news setting, instead, the manager uses a mixed strategy: as time passes without
the arrival of good news and the manager becomes more pessimistic, he follows a random
quitting policy, abandoning the project at a later time than the efficient (pure) stopping time.
In both settings, distortions are increasing, and welfare is decreasing, in the importance of
career concerns.
Our characterization yields two main results. First, we show that in the bad news setting,
distortions are more pronounced when the expected quality of the project is relatively higher.5
Distortions in this setting take the form of the manager keeping the project after learning
that it is bad, namely when bad news first arrive after time t∗. When the prior probability
of a good project increases, t∗ decreases, meaning that the manager is even less likely to quit
following bad news. We show that this higher tendency not to terminate bad projects more
than compensates for the fact that a bad project is less likely, so the overall distortion increases
when expected quality rises. This result contrasts with what we find in the good news setting.
Distortions in that setting take the form of the manager keeping the project after enough time
has passed and good news have not arrived, namely after he has reached the efficient stopping
time without good news. When the prior probability of a good project increases, the manager
is more likely to keep the project for a longer period of time; however, the efficient stopping
time also increases, so good news are more likely to arrive prior to this time. We show that
as a consequence, distortions can decrease with expected quality in the good news setting.
Our second main result concerns the effects of information. Suppose that it is possible to
release a public signal at the beginning of time that makes the market and manager’s common
prior on the project more precise. This signal allows for a better assessment of the quality of
projects and thus always weakly increases first-best welfare. The effects on equilibrium welfare
depend on how the signal affects distortions. Naturally, if the signal is perfect, it eliminates
distortions, as the manager’s actions cannot influence the market’s belief when the project’s
quality is known. We show however that in the bad news setting, the effects of information
are non-monotonic: a sufficiently imperfect signal increases the distortion relative to first best
and reduces welfare. Intuitively, a high signal realization increases the prior that the project
is good and (by the result described above) increases the distortion relative to first best,
whereas a low signal realization reduces the prior and thus reduces the distortion. We find
that distortions are convex in the prior, and therefore the former effect dominates when the
signal is sufficiently imperfect.6 Moreover, such a signal leaves first-best welfare unchanged,
5We describe here our results for “intermediate” parameter values, under which the equilibrium features
an interior time t∗ ∈ (0,∞). See Section 2 for details.
6As elaborated in Section 2, the convexity results from the fact that an increase in the prior brings the
distortion forward in time while a reduction in the prior postpones it, and discounting is convex.
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so the increase in distortions causes overall welfare to go down. These results are in contrast
with what we find in the good news setting: releasing a public signal about project quality at
the beginning of time always increases welfare when the manager learns through good news.
Our analysis highlights the role of dynamic aspects in shaping the effects of career concerns
and yields different predictions for different applications. Returning to the banking industry,
we find that the nature of learning in this industry explains why banks generate distortions
especially in good times, and moreover implies that releasing information about the quality
of credit may not help but rather exacerbate distortions. An implication of our analysis is
the need for policy that pays close attention to refinancing during boom periods as well as
the effects of supervisory tests and disclosure requirements. Simple restrictions are unlikely
to do the job; in fact, policy aimed at reducing bad debt must deal with the problem that
banks are often “creative” when it comes to refinancing loans. For the case of China, The
Wall Street Journal (2013) explains that “banks need a reason to justify rolling over a loan,
particularly if a company can’t repay it. (...) When they do roll over loans, Chinese banks
sometimes do it in creative ways. To skirt restrictions on rolling over loans, banks cooperate
with informal lenders that provide bank customers with short-term loans with high interest
rates. That borrowing is used to repay a bank loan on the understanding that the bank will
issue a new loan two or three weeks later. Such behavior can, in some instances, lead to bigger
corporate-debt burdens.”
Related literature. There is a large literature on career concerns. One strand of this
literature, in the tradition of Holmstro¨m (1999), studies moral hazard models in which career
concerns are beneficial because they incentivize agents to exert effort. These are models where
outcomes are observable but actions are not.7 Our paper fits into a different strand of this
literature, in which career concerns are detrimental because they lead to perverse incentives.
Here actions are observable but outcomes are not. A seminal paper is Prendergast and Stole
(1996), where an agent has private information about his ability to understand the state of the
world and distorts his decisions over time to look as a fast learner. Related issues are studied
in Scharfstein and Stein (1990), Zwiebel (1995), Majumdar and Mukand (2004), Prat (2005),
Ottaviani and Sørensen (2006), and Aghion and Jackson (2016).8
Within finance, as mentioned above, Rajan (1994) studies a static model in which a career-
concerned bank manager chooses whether to implement a liberal credit policy that makes a
bad loan less visible. Makarov and Plantin (2015) show that a fund manager will want to take
7Bonatti and Ho¨rner (2015) consider a version of Holmstro¨m’s model with exponential learning.
8Reputational concerns also lead to bad outcomes in Morris (2001) and Ely and Va¨lima¨ki (2003), where an
agent’s type determines whether his preferences are aligned with those of the principal.
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on hidden tail risk when concerned with investors’ perception of his ability to generate excess
returns above a fair compensation for risk. A number of papers point out that managers with
stock-based compensation may still have a conflict of interest with shareholders (see Bond,
Edmans and Goldstein, 2012, Section 3 for a survey), although only a few study how this
conflict can result in actions directly aimed at concealing or revealing information. Among
these, Benmelech, Kandel and Veronesi (2010) show that to prevent stock price reductions,
managers may use suboptimal investment policies that conceal slowdowns in the firm’s growth
opportunities. Frenkel (2017) examines a dynamic bargaining model in which managers with
stock-sensitive compensation distort the price and timing of over-the-counter asset sales.
Our model is more closely related to those in Grenadier, Malenko and Strebulaev (2014),
Bobtcheff and Levy (2017), and Thomas (2016), all of which consider environments with
exponential learning.9 Grenadier et al. (2014) examine an experimentation setting with public
good news in which an agent is privately informed about his value of project success. The
agent delays stopping because, unlike in our model, stopping at a later time signals a higher
type.10 Bobtcheff and Levy (2017) analyze a real option model in which a cash-constrained
agent may learn bad news prior to investing. The agent wants to convey that his privately
known learning intensity is high to raise capital more cheaply, and this can lead to hurried
or delayed investment. Thomas (2016) studies a career concerns problem similar to ours, in
which an agent learns about a project over time and can choose to abandon it. In her model,
however, successes and failures are public, the agent learns privately from partially informative
signals without cash-flow consequences, and the agent receives a reputation payoff only when
the project succeeds, fails, or is terminated. The focus is also different: Thomas examines
the conditions under which efficiency obtains,11 whereas we study the pattern of distortions,
specifically how distortions vary with expected project quality and information about quality.
More broadly, our paper is related to a sizable literature on exponential-bandit learning,
including the seminal work of Keller, Rady and Cripps (2005). Most of this literature studies
learning through good news, but there are exceptions: in addition to the papers described
above, Bonatti and Ho¨rner (2017) and Keller and Rady (2015) consider bad news learning, and
Che and Ho¨rner (2017), Frick and Ishii (2015), and Khromenkova (2015) compare good news
9Also related is Bar-Isaac (2003), where a monopolist sells units over time whose (observable) success
depends on the monopolist’s fixed quality. While there is no private learning, the monopolist may have initial
superior information about his quality, and thus his decision to continue trading can serve as a signal.
10The paper shows that if a public shock forces some agents to stop, then others will blend with the crowd
and stop strategically at the same time. Related papers of strategic delay include Acharya, DeMarzo and
Kremer (2011) and Grenadier and Malenko (2011). See also Gratton, Holden and Kolotilin (2017).
11In her model, whether the first best is implementable depends on the intensity of the agent’s reputational
concern and the sign and relative informativeness of public and private news.
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and bad news learning in various contexts.12 Some articles study how information disclosure
affects experimentation, although this information is typically about outcomes rather than the
underlying state as in our paper. In a career concerns setting, see Pei (2015) and, outside the
exponential bandit framework, Ho¨rner and Lambert (2016).13
1 Model
Players and actions. Consider an agent and a market. Time is continuous, the horizon
is infinite, and the discount rate is r > 0. The agent has a project and, at each time t ≥ 0,
decides whether to continue working on the project or to stop. To simplify the exposition, we
assume that stopping is irreversible.14
The quality of the agent’s project is either “good” or “bad”, a fully persistent state. Work-
ing on the project yields the agent an instantaneous payoff x ∈ R, capturing the instantaneous
cost of working and any deterministic flow revenue from the project (so that x may be positive
or negative). In addition, if the agent works at time t and the project is bad, the agent receives
a lump-sum payoff of −1 at t with instantaneous probability λB ≥ 0; if the agent works at
time t and the project is good, he receives a lump-sum payoff of 1 at t with instantaneous
probability λG ≥ 0. This structure allows us to embed both a bad news setting and a good
news setting, as we describe below. We assume x+ λG > 0 > x− λB, i.e. the expected payoff
from the project is positive if the project is known to be good and negative if it is known to
be bad. The payoff from not working is normalized to zero.
Information. The quality of the agent’s project is initially unknown to both the agent and
the market. We denote by µt the agent’s time-t belief that the project is good. The exogenous
prior belief is µ0 ∈ (0, 1), commonly known also to the market.
The market only observes the agent’s decision at each point of whether to continue or
to stop working on the project; the realized payoffs from the project are nonverifiable and
privately observed by the agent. Hence, at any time t > 0, the market’s belief about the
project may differ from the agent’s belief, as it is updated based on the agent’s actions only.
We denote by µ̂t the market’s time-t belief that the project is good.
12See also Abreu, Milgrom and Pearce (1991) and Board and Meyer-ter-Vehn (2012).
13Rosenberg, Solan and Vieille (2007) study a model of social experimentation in which agents observe
their opponents’ actions but not their opponents’ payoffs, and the decision to abandon the risky project is
irreversible. Quah and Strulovici (2009) examine the comparative statics of optimal stopping time problems
in a general framework.
14One can show that given our solution concept, this irreversibility assumption will be without loss.
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Since the quality of the project is uncertain and may be learnt when the agent works, we
say that the agent “experiments” when he runs the project.
Bad news versus good news. We focus on a setting in which the agent learns about
project quality through bad news events: λB > λG = 0, and, to avoid trivialities, we then
assume x > 0 (where, as noted, x− λB < 0). The agent therefore earns small profits so long
as he does not experience a “failure,” namely a lump-sum payoff of −1. Learning in this bad
news environment takes the form of slow improvement in the agent’s belief µt until the agent
fails and learns that the project is bad. We contrast this setting with one in which learning
occurs through good news events: λG > λB = 0, and (again to avoid trivialities) we then
assume x < 0 (where, as noted, x + λG > 0). Here the agent incurs small losses so long as
he does not experience a “success,” namely a lump-sum payoff of 1. Learning in this good
news environment takes the form of slow deterioration of the agent’s belief µt until the agent
succeeds and learns that the project is good.
Payoffs. The agent cares not only about the payoff from the project but also about how
his project is perceived by the market. The quality of the project reflects the agent’s skills
and potential to select and successfully work on new projects. A career-concerned agent will
therefore want the market to believe that his project is good rather than bad.
Following Rajan (1994) and Prendergast and Stole (1996), we take the agent’s payoff at
each time t ≥ 0 to be a weighted sum of the project payoff and the reputation payoff the agent
receives from the market’s perception, µ̂tR, where R ≥ 0. Specifically, if the agent works on
the project only until time τ , his time-0 payoff is∫ ∞
0
e−rt {[x+ µ0λG − (1− µ0)λB] 1t<τ + µ̂tR} dt, (1)
where 1t<τ is an indicator function taking the value 1 if t < τ and zero otherwise. This
formulation captures, in a simple reduced form, any benefits the agent may enjoy from having
a high reputation, such as outside options that increase the agent’s wage or the possibility
of working on additional projects.15 For example, like money managers in Dasgupta and
Piacentino (2015), banks differ in their ability to pick good investments, and they benefit
from having a reputation for being good pickers as this allows them to attract more capital.
Entrepreneurs and venture capital funds have similar career concerns, especially since they
must repeatedly raise money from investors, as emphasized by Baker (2000).16
15The agent’s reputation payoff could also arise from a dependence of his compensation on stock prices which
reflect the market’s valuation of the project.
16One can consider a variant of our model in which, as in Rajan (1994), the quality of the project is
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We will refer to expression (1) when R = 0 as social welfare. Controlling for project
quality, society does not benefit from the agent having a high reputation, and the efficient
allocation of productive resources is the one that maximizes the profits from the project. For
example, if the project is a publicly traded company, then welfare corresponds to the utility
of the investors.
To focus the exposition, throughout the paper we assume parameters are such that some
experimentation is socially efficient, even if the agent is myopic:
Assumption 1. Some experimentation is always efficient: x+ µ0λG − (1− µ0)λB > 0.
Strategies and equilibrium. The agent’s history at time t, ht, consists of his private
history of payoff realizations up to t and the public history of the agent’s actions up to t. Let
{Ω,H,P} be the probability space and (Ht)t≥0 the filtration generated by the history ht. A
pure strategy for the agent is an Ht-adapted stopping time τ : Ω → R+ ∪ {∞}. Following
Shmaya and Solan (2018), we define a mixed strategy for the agent as a randomized stopping
time, namely an adapted [0, 1]-valued process ρ = (ρt)t≥0 with right-continuous nondecreasing
paths. This mixed strategy is a cumulative distribution function that measures, for each t ≥ 0,
the probability to stop before or at time t.
The agent’s beliefs µ = (µt)t≥0 are adapted to Ht. The market’s beliefs µ̂ = (µ̂t)t≥0 are
adapted to the filtration generated by the agent’s stopping time.
An equilibrium is defined as a pair {ρ, µ̂} such that: (i) given µ̂, every stopping time τ in
the support of the randomized stopping time represented by ρ solves
sup
τ
∫ ∞
0
e−rt {[x+ µ0λG − (1− µ0)λB] 1t<τ + µ̂tR} dt,
and (ii) given ρ, µ̂ is computed by Bayes’ rule for all public histories on the equilibrium path.17
As is standard in signaling games, we use a refinement to rule out equilibria that can arise
only due to unreasonable beliefs off the equilibrium path. Let µ̂1t be the market’s time-t belief
that the project is good conditional on the agent not having stopped by t, and let µ̂0t (t
′) be
the market’s time-t belief conditional on the agent having stopped at time t′ ≤ t. We require
the following belief monotonicity property on off-the-equilibrium-path beliefs: if τ < t with
probability one (that is, ρt = 1), then µ̂
1
t ≥ µ̂0t (t′) for all t′ ≤ t.
determined by the state of the economy and the ability of the agent, and the agent cares about the market’s
perception of his ability. Our main results would apply to such a setting. Details are available upon request.
17We note that in our game, the agent has no private information at time 0. Hence, the market’s belief
cannot change upon observing the agent’s decision of whether to start or not the project. This is sometimes
described as a “no signaling what you don’t know” condition (see Watson, 2016).
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Our refinement is in the same spirit as the Divinity refinement introduced by Banks and
Sobel (1987),18 and is similar to the belief monotonicity requirements used in other continuous-
time signaling models such as Daley and Green (2012), Gul and Pesendorfer (2012), and
Strebulaev, Zhu and Zryumov (2016). In our game, for any given beliefs of the market,
continuing with the project at a time t > 0 is always more attractive to an agent who has
not failed/has succeeded by t than to one who has failed/has not succeeded by t. Hence,
we require that if the agent continues at a time by which the candidate equilibrium strategy
specifies having stopped, the market should assign weakly higher probability to the agent not
having failed/having succeeded, and hence to the agent’s project being good, than if the agent
had indeed stopped.19 Without belief monotonicity, one could construct equilibria in which
the market’s off-the-equilibrium-path beliefs “punish” the agent for deviating to continuing
with the project, therefore forcing him to abandon the project by an arbitrary time.20
We will indicate where we use belief monotonicity in our discussions in the text and in the
proofs in the Appendix. From now on, equilibrium refers to an equilibrium as defined above
satisfying this refinement.
2 Bad news
Consider a setting in which the agent learns about project quality from the arrival of a failure:
λB > x > λG = 0. With a slight abuse of notation, denote by µt the agent’s belief that the
project is good at time t given that he has run the project and not failed up to t. By Bayes’
rule:
µt =
µ0
µ0 + (1− µ0)e−λBt
. (2)
The evolution of this belief is governed by
µ˙t = µt (1− µt)λB. (3)
As the agent works without failing, his belief that the project is good goes up. If at any time
the agent fails, his belief jumps down to zero.
18We cannot apply Divinity directly as we study an infinite horizon continuous-time game.
19As we will see, Bayes’ rule implies that the market’s belief weakly increases upon observing an agent’s
on-path decision to continue, and belief monotonicity extends this property to off the equilibrium path.
20Such equilibria would fail forward induction reasoning: as noted, the agent who has not failed/has suc-
ceeded, and whose project is thus more likely to be good, is precisely the type of agent who has relatively more
to gain from continuing with the project.
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2.1 First best
Suppose R = 0, so the agent does not have a career concern and maximizes social welfare.
Since a failure reveals that the project is bad, the first-best solution prescribes abandoning the
project as soon as it fails. Moreover, since the agent’s belief that the project is good increases
over time in the absence of failure, an agent who starts working should continue working so
long as the project has not failed. The value of starting the project at time 0 is
SFB0 = µ0
x
r
+ (1− µ0)
x− λB
r + λB
> 0, (4)
where the inequality follows from Assumption 1. Hence, the first best entails working on the
project absent failure and stopping immediately when a failure occurs.
2.2 Career concerns
Consider now the setting with R > 0, i.e. where the agent cares about both the payoff from the
project and the market’s belief about project quality. Because an agent with a good project
cannot fail whereas one with a bad project can, the agent would like to make the market
believe that a failure has not occurred.
Suppose the agent starts working on the project at time 0. We begin by showing that the
agent never stops in the absence of failure.
Lemma 1. In any equilibrium, if the agent starts the project at time 0 and does not fail by
time t > 0, he continues with the project at t.
(All proofs are in the Appendix.)
To see the logic, suppose the agent starts working at time 0 and continues without failing
until time t > 0. Since the project’s expected payoff at t is then strictly positive, the agent
would choose to stop at t only if stopping gives him a reputation gain compared to continuing.
However, this cannot happen on the equilibrium path: if an agent who has not failed was
willing to stop at t, an agent who has failed would strictly prefer to stop by t, and therefore
stopping would not increase the market’s belief that the agent’s project is good. Furthermore,
by our belief monotonicity refinement, this cannot happen off the equilibrium path either.
Lemma 1 implies that if the agent stops at a time t > 0, the market learns that the agent
has failed by t. Hence,
Corollary 1. If the agent stops at time t > 0 in equilibrium, the market’s belief that the
project is good at t′ ≥ t is zero.
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Note that the market’s belief upon observing that the agent stops is independent of the
time at which he stops: the market learns that the agent has failed, but the time at which the
agent failed contains no information about project quality.
Consider next the market’s belief that the project is good when the agent has not stopped
by t, which we denote by µ̂1t . Given that an agent who has not failed always continues with the
project, this belief is determined by whether and when an agent who has failed stops. Suppose
the agent were to follow the first-best strategy, i.e. stop immediately upon failure. Then the
market’s belief would be µ̂1t = µt, where µt is given by (2); that is, the market’s belief about
the project would coincide with the agent’s belief. This implies that µ̂1t would be increasing
over time.
Given these market’s beliefs, would the agent indeed have incentives to stop immediately
upon failing at a time t > 0? If the agent stops at t, his continuation payoff is zero (cf. Corol-
lary 1). Suppose instead that the agent continues working on the project after failing at t.
Since the market’s belief is increasing over time so long as the agent has not stopped and it
is constant and independent of the time at which the agent stops after he stops, the agent
continues working forever if he continues working after failing at t. Hence, the agent’s expected
payoff from continuing is ∫ ∞
t
e−r(s−t) (x− λB + µsR) ds. (5)
The agent is willing to stop at a time t at which he fails if and only if (5) is negative at this
time. Since the first-best strategy requires that the agent stop whenever a failure occurs, (5)
must be negative at all t > 0; given limt→∞ µt = 1, this requires
R ≤ −(x− λB). (6)
In addition, the first-best strategy prescribes the agent to start working at time 0; as explained
below, Assumption 1 ensures that the agent indeed has incentives to do so.
Condition (6) is satisfied if the agent’s career concern is sufficiently small. If instead R is
large enough that this condition fails, there will exist a time t > 0 at which the agent will
not want to stop upon failure. Intuitively, from that time on, the agent’s cost of losing his
reputation would exceed his cost of continuing working on a bad project forever.
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continuation payo↵ from continuing isZ 1
t
e r(⌧ t)
 
x   B + pˆ1⌧R
 
d⌧ . (15)
The agent is willing to stop at any time t at which he fails only if (14) exceeds
(15) for all t > 0, or, equivalently, since limt!1 pˆ1t = 1, only if
(1  pˆ0)R + (x   B)  0. (16)
In addition, the first best requires that the agent start working at time 0;
our assumption that x   (1   µ0) B   0 ensures that the agent indeed has
incentives to do so (as elaborated in fn. 4 below).
Condition (16) is satisfied if the agent’s career concern is su ciently small.
If, on the other hand, R is large enough that this condition fails, there will
exist a time t > 0 at which the agent will not want to stop upon failure: the
agent’s cost of losing his reputation exceeds his cost of continuing working on
a bad project.
Proposition 2 (Bad news). The equilibrium is unique. If (1   pˆ0)R + (x  
 B)  0, the equilibrium implements the first best. If (1  pˆ0)R+(x  B) > 0,
the equilibrium is a threshold equilibrium with threshold time t⇤   0: the agent
starts working at time 0, stops immediately upon failure if he fails at t < t⇤,
and continues working forever otherwise. If (p0   pˆ0)R + (x    B)   0, then
t⇤ = 0; otherwise, t⇤ is given by
 
pˆ1t⇤   pˆ0
 
R + (x   B) = 0. (17)
In a threshold equilibrium with threshold time t⇤, the agent stops at a time
t if and only if a failure occurs at t and t < t⇤. The market’s time-t belief
that the agent’s ability is high is pˆ0 if the agent has stopped by t, pˆ1t if the
agent has not stopped by t and t  t⇤, and pˆ1t⇤ if the agent has not stopped
by t and t > t⇤, where pˆ0 and pˆ1t are given by (12) and (13) respectively. If
(p0   pˆ0)R + (x   B)   0, the agent always prefers to continue after failure,
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The agent’s indi↵erence condition is now
R
 bµ1t   µt + x+ µt G✓Vt   Rr
◆
= 0. (1)
Since this must hold at each time at which the agent mixes, di↵erentiating this condition
yields b˙µ1tR = µ˙tR  µ˙t G✓Vt   Rr
◆
  µt GV˙t. (2)
We rewrite (2) by substituting with V˙t =  bµ1tR + r (Vt   v), v = 1 +  G+xr , µ˙t =
 µt(1  µt) G, and (1):
b˙µ1tR = [2 Gµt + r    G](bµ1tR + x) + µt (r +  G) ( G  R). (3)
Consider first the case in which R+x > 0 > µ0R+x, so that t is finite and t infinite.
The di↵erential equation has a closed-form solution:
bµ1t = ertKµt(1  µt)µ0(1  µ0)   1rR [µt( G  R)[r +  G(1  µt)] + rx] , (4)
where K is a constant given by the boundary conditions. Substituting (4) into Vt =
v +R
R1
t
e r(s t)bp1sds and integrating yields
Vt = v +
ertKRµt
 Gµ0(1  µ0)
  1
r
[x+ µt( G  R)] .
The value of t depends on µ0. Using the expression for Vt above, K and t can be
found by solving the following system:
bµ1t = µ0, (5)
R(µ0   µt) + x+ µt G
✓
Vt   R
r
◆
= 0. (6)
µ0 µ
0
0 µ
00
0
1
The agent’s indi↵erence condition is now
R
 bµ1t   µt + x+ µt G✓Vt   Rr
◆
= 0. (1)
Since this must hold at each time at which the agent mixes, di↵erentiating this condition
yields b˙µ1tR = µ˙tR  µ˙t G✓Vt   Rr
◆
  µt GV˙t. (2)
We rewrite (??) by substituting with V˙t =  bµ1tR + r (Vt   v), v = 1 +  G+xr , µ˙t =
 µt(1  µt) G, and (??):
b˙µ1tR = [2 Gµt + r    G](bµ1tR + x) + µt (r +  G) ( G  R). (3)
Consider first the case in which R+x > 0 > µ0R+x, so that t is finite and t infinite.
The di↵erential equation has a closed-form solution:
bµ1t = ertKµt(1  µt)µ0(1  µ0)   1rR [µt( G  R)[r +  G(1  µt)] + rx] , (4)
where K is a constant given by the boundary conditions. Substituting (??) into Vt =
v +R
R1
t
 r(s t)bp1sds a d integrating yields
Vt = v +
ertKRµt
 Gµ0(1  µ0)
  1
r
[x+ µt( G  R)] .
The value of t depends on µ0. Using the expression for Vt above, K and t can be
found by solving the following system:
bµ1t = µ0, (5)
R(µ0   µt) + x+ µt G
✓
Vt   R
r
◆
= 0. (6)
bµ1t
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  x
R
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4     Examples Bad News.nb
1 Compute stopping policy
Discretize time in periods of dt length, so t 2 {0, dt, 2dt, ...}. Assume tFB and t are on the grid, i.e.,
tFB/dt and t/dt are integers. The probability that a good project succeeds over a period of length dt
is  Gdt. Then the probability that a good project succeeds before time t is: 1  (1   Gdt)
t
dt .
We know that the agent continues for sure until time t. At that point, bµ1t = µ0. Now take bµ1t+dt.
We know what this is, and we want to compute the probability that the agent continues over [t, t+dt]
absent success. Call  tdt the probability that the agent drops over [t, t+ dt] absent success. Then
bµ1t+dt = µ0
h
1  (1   Gdt)
t
dt
i
+ µ0(1   Gdt)
t
dt (1   tdt)
µ0
h
1  (1   Gdt)
t
dt
i
+ (µ0(1   Gdt)
t
dt + 1  µ0)(1   tdt)
Call  t+dtdt the probability that the agent drops over [t + dt, t + 2dt] absent success. Then the
probability that an agent who has a bad project will stay until time t+ 2dt is
(1   tdt)(1   t+dtdt)
Now note that an agent who has a good project and had not succeeded by t and stayed till t+ dt
may have succeeded over [t, t + dt], in which case he stays from t + dt on. The probability that he
succeeded over that interval is  Gdt. Then the probability that an agent who has a good project and
had not succeeded by time t will stay until t+ 2dt is
(1   tdt)[ Gdt+ (1   Gdt)(1   t+dtdt)]
We compute
bµ1t+2dt = µ0
h
1  (1   Gdt)
t
dt
i
+ µ0(1   Gdt)
t
dt (1   tdt)[ Gdt+ (1   Gdt)(1   t+dtdt)]"
µ0
h
1  (1   Gdt)
t
dt
i
+ µ0(1   Gdt)
t
dt (1   1dt)[ Gdt+ (1   Gdt)(1   t+dtdt)]
+(1  µ0)(1   tdt)(1   t+dtdt)
#
And we can continue doing this for t+ 3dt, etc.
To check: Confirm that as we take dt smaller and smaller, the change in  tdt also gets smaller
and smaller, so these probabilities converge to the continuous time limit. To see this, let  t be defined
as:  t dt = 1, and for t   t,
 t = ⇧
t
⌧=t(1   ⌧dt) = (1   tdt)(1   t+dtdt)(1   t+2dtdt)...(1   t+ndtdt)
for t + ndt = t. Plot  t for di↵erent values of small dt (i.e., plot di↵erent lines on the same graph,
with t on the x-axis, starting at t = t  dt).
1
Figure 1: Market’s belief and threshold time in the equilibrium of the bad news setting. Parameters
are µ0 = 0.6, x = 0.75, λB = 1.8, R = 1.2, and r = 1.
Proposition 1 (Bad news setting). The equilibrium is unique. There exists a threshold time
t∗ ≥ 0 such that the agent starts working at time 0, stops immediately if he fails at t < t∗, and
continues working otherwise.
The market’s time-t belief conditional on the agent not having stopped by t is µ̂1t = µt for t ≤ t∗
and µ̂1t = µt∗ for t > t
∗. The market’s time-t belief conditional on the agent having stopped by
t is 0, both on and off the equilibrium path.
The threshold time satisfies t∗ = ∞ if R ≤ −(x − λB) and t∗ = 0 if R ≥ −(x − λB)/µ0. If
−(x− λB) < R < −(x− λB)/µ0, then t∗ is given by
x− λB + µt∗R = 0. (7)
The equilibrium is characterized by a threshold time t∗ ≥ 0 such that the agent stops
at t if and only if a failure occurs at t and t < t∗. As discussed above, if R ≤ −(x − λB),
the equilibrium implements the first best, so t∗ = ∞ in this case. At the other extreme, if
R ≥ −(x−λB)/µ0, the agent always prefers to continue after failure, so t∗ = 0. The threshold
time is interior when −(x− λB) < R < −(x− λB)/µ0. In this case, the hreshold time is the
time t∗ at which the agent is indifferent between stopping and continuing given that he has
failed at t∗, given by equation (7). Figure 1 illustrates the market’s equilibrium belief µ̂1t in
an example with such an interior time t∗.
The agent’s time-0 expected payoff from following the equilibrium strategy with threshold
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time t∗ is
pi0(t
∗) = µ0
(
x
r
+
∫ t∗
0
e−rtµtRdt+ e
−rt∗ µt∗R
r
)
+ (1− µ0)
[∫ t∗
0
e−(r+λB)t (x− λB + µtR) dt+ e−(r+λB)t
∗ (x− λB + µt∗R)
r
]
.
A sufficient condition for the agent to prefer following the equilibrium strategy rather than
never working is pi0(0) ≥ µ0R/r, which is satisfied by Assumption 1. In fact, given this
assumption, we can show that a no-work equilibrium (in which the agent never works on
the project) does not exist. Intuitively, if a no-work equilibrium exists, it exists when the
market’s beliefs are such that the agent’s reputation benefit from starting the project at time
0 is minimized. These beliefs correspond to the market expecting the agent to never stop once
he starts working — so that µ̂1t = µ0 for all t > 0 — and believing that the agent has failed
if he ever stops.21 However, since the agent’s payoff from never working is µ0R/r, it is clear
that under Assumption 1 the agent would prefer working forever to never working.
We can therefore show that the unique equilibrium is the equilibrium characterized in
Proposition 1. Suppose the agent’s career concern R is intermediate so that the threshold
time t∗ is interior. Applied to the banking industry, the equilibrium says that a bank will
stop rolling over a borrower’s debt if it learns early enough that the borrower is in distress.
However, as the borrower repays and the bank keeps lending, the bank’s reputation increases.
At some point, the reputational cost of admitting losses becomes high enough that the bank
would choose to roll over a bad loan.22
Since a bank that keeps the debt until time t∗ continues refinancing it regardless of its
value, the market learns no information about the quality of the bank’s loans after this time.
Yet, note that the market expects more losses as time goes by. Specifically, let ηt be the
probability that the agent has failed by time t given that the agent has not stopped by t. In
the first best, ηt = 0 for all t ≥ 0, since the agent stops immediately when a failure occurs.
Instead, in an equilibrium with finite threshold time t∗, ηt = 0 for t < t
∗ and
ηt = (1− µt∗)
[
1− e−λB(t−t∗)]
21Recall that the agent has no private information at time 0; hence, the market’s belief cannot change upon
observing the agent’s start decision.
22While here the agent may keep a bad project forever, a variant of our model in which bad news become
public with positive probability would yield analogous results and ensure that the agent stops in finite time.
Details are available upon request.
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for t ≥ t∗, since the agent does not stop upon failing after t∗.
Corollary 2. The market’s belief that the agent has failed conditional on the agent not having
stopped is increasing over time.
For the banking industry, these equilibrium dynamics have the flavor of a “crisis buildup”:
banks continue rolling over (bad) loans and the market becomes increasingly concerned that
banks are accumulating losses.
2.3 Expected quality and information
Social welfare in an equilibrium with threshold time t∗ is equal to
S0(t
∗) = µ0
x
r
+ (1− µ0)(x− λB)
[
1− e−(r+λB)t∗
r + λB
+
e−(r+λB)t
∗
r
]
. (8)
Note that S0(t
∗) coincides with SFB0 in equation (4) if and only if t
∗ = ∞. Clearly, ceteris
paribus, welfare S0(t
∗) decreases, and the distortion SFB0 −S0(t∗) increases, when the threshold
time t∗ declines.
The welfare effects of career concerns are then immediate from Proposition 1. The higher
is the agent’s concern for his reputation R, the lower is the equilibrium threshold time t∗, and
hence the lower is social welfare and the larger is the distortion relative to first best.
What are the welfare effects of an increase in the expected quality of projects? Suppose
the prior probability of a good project, µ0, increases. First-best welfare then naturally goes
up. Moreover, since the agent’s career concern distorts actions away from first best only when
the project is bad, an increase in µ0 has a direct effect of decreasing the distortion for any fixed
threshold time t∗. However, an increase in µ0 also reduces the equilibrium threshold time t
∗:
when expected project quality is higher, the agent’s reputation loss from ending the project
at any time t increases, and the time t∗ after which the agent prefers to continue upon failing
decreases. We show that in net, an increase in µ0 increases welfare, but, for interior solutions,
it also increases the distortion generated by the agent’s career concern.
Proposition 2 (Expected quality in bad news setting). Suppose parameters {µ0, x, λB, R, r}
satisfy −(x− λB)/µ0 > R > −(x− λB) (so the equilibrium features t∗ ∈ (0,∞)) and consider
changes in µ0 that preserve this property and Assumption 1. An increase in µ0 increases
welfare but it also increases the distortion relative to first best.
For intuition, note that the distortion relative to first best is equal to the losses the agent
generates when he does not stop upon failing. By Proposition 1, the agent does not stop
14
continuation payo↵ from continuing isZ 1
t
e r(⌧ t)
 
x   B + pˆ1⌧R
 
d⌧ . (15)
The agent is willing to stop at any time t at which he fails only if (14) exceeds
(15) for all t > 0, or, equivalently, since limt!1 pˆ1t = 1, only if
(1  pˆ0)R + (x   B)  0. (16)
In addition, the first best requires that the agent start working at time 0;
our assumption that x   (1   µ0) B   0 ensures that the agent indeed has
incentives to do so (as elaborated in fn. 4 below).
Condition (16) is satisfied if the agent’s career concern is su ciently small.
If, on the other hand, R is large enough that this condition fails, there will
exist a time t > 0 at which the agent will not want to stop upon failure: the
agent’s cost of losing his reputation exceeds his cost of continuing working on
a bad project.
Proposition 2 (Bad news). The equilibrium is unique. If (1   pˆ0)R + (x  
 B)  0, the equilibrium implements the first best. If (1  pˆ0)R+(x  B) > 0,
the equilibrium is a threshold equilibrium with threshold time t⇤   0: the agent
starts working at time 0, stops immediately upon failure if he fails at t < t⇤,
and continues working forever otherwise. If (p0   pˆ0)R + (x    B)   0, then
t⇤ = 0; otherwise, t⇤ is given by
 
pˆ1t⇤   pˆ0
 
R + (x   B) = 0. (17)
In a threshold equilibrium with threshold time t⇤, the agent stops at a time
t if and only if a failure occurs at t and t < t⇤. The market’s time-t belief
that the agent’s ability is high is pˆ0 if the agent has stopped by t, pˆ1t if the
agent has not stopped by t and t  t⇤, and pˆ1t⇤ if the agent has not stopped
by t and t > t⇤, where pˆ0 and pˆ1t are given by (12) and (13) respectively. If
(p0   pˆ0)R + (x   B)   0, the agent always prefers to continue after failure,
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The agent’s indi↵erence condition is now
R
 bµ1t   µt + x+ µt G✓Vt   Rr
◆
= 0. (1)
Since this must hold at each time at which the agent mixes, di↵erentiating this condition
yields b˙µ1tR = µ˙tR  µ˙t G✓Vt   Rr
◆
  µt GV˙t. (2)
We rewrite (2) by substituting with V˙t =  bµ1tR + r (Vt   v), v = 1 +  G+xr , µ˙t =
 µt(1  µt) G, and (1):
b˙µ1tR = [2 Gµt + r    G](bµ1tR + x) + µt (r +  G) ( G  R). (3)
Consider first the case in which R+x > 0 > µ0R+x, so that t is finite and t infinite.
The di↵erential equation has a closed-form solution:
bµ1t = ertKµt(1  µt)µ0(1  µ0)   1rR [µt( G  R)[r +  G(1  µt)] + rx] , (4)
where K is a constant given by the boundary conditions. Substituting (4) into Vt =
v +R
R1
t
e r(s t)bp1sds and integrating yields
Vt = v +
ertKRµt
 Gµ0(1  µ0)
  1
r
[x+ µt( G  R)] .
The value of t depends on µ0. Using the expression for Vt above, K and t can be
found by solving the following system:
bµ1t = µ0, (5)
R(µ0   µt) + x+ µt G
✓
Vt   R
r
◆
= 0. (6)
µ0 µ
0
0 µ
00
0
1
The agent’s indi↵erence condition is now
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 bµ1t   µt + x+ µt G✓Vt   Rr
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yields b˙µ1tR = µ˙tR  µ˙t G✓Vt   Rr
◆
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b˙µ1tR = [2 Gµt + r    G](bµ1tR + x) + µt (r +  G) ( G  R). (3)
Consider first the case in which R+x > 0 > µ0R+x, so that t is finite and t infinite.
The di↵erential equation has a closed-form solution:
bµ1t = ertKµt(1  µt)µ0(1  µ0)   1rR [µ ( G  R)[r +  G(1  µt)] + rx] , (4)
where K is a constant given by the boundary conditions. Substituting (4) into Vt =
v +R
R1
t
e r(s t)bp1sds and integrating yields
Vt = v +
ertKRµt
 Gµ0(1  µ0)
  1
r
[x+ µt( G  R)] .
The value of t depends on µ0. Using the expression for Vt above, K and t can be
found by solving the following system:
bµ1t = µ0, (5)
R(µ0   µt) + x+ µt G
✓
Vt   R
r
◆
= 0. (6)
µ0 µ
0
0 µ
00
0
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The agent’s indi↵erence condition is now
R
 bµ1t   µt + x+ µt G✓Vt   Rr
◆
= 0. (1)
Since this must hold at each time at which the agent mixes, di↵erentiating this condition
yields b˙µ1tR = µ˙tR  µ˙t G✓Vt   Rr
◆
  µt GV˙t. (2)
We rewrite (??) by substituting with V˙t =  bµ1tR + r (Vt   v), v = 1 +  G+xr , µ˙t =
 µt(1  µt) G, and (??):
b˙µ1tR = [2 Gµt + r    G](bµ1tR + x) + µt (r +  G) ( G  R). (3)
Consider first the case in which R+x > 0 > µ0R+x, so that t is finite and t infinite.
The di↵erential equation has a closed-form solution:
bµ1t = ertKµt(1  µt)µ0(1  µ0)   1rR [µt( G  R)[r +  G(1  µt)] + rx] , (4)
where K is a constant given by the boundary conditions. Substituting (??) into Vt =
v +R
R1
t
 r(s t)bp1sds a d integrating yields
Vt = v +
ertKRµt
 Gµ0(1  µ0)
  1
r
[x+ µt( G  R)] .
The value of t depends on µ0. Using the expression for Vt above, K and t can be
found by solving the following system:
bµ1t = µ0, (5)
R(µ0   µt) + x+ µt G
✓
Vt   R
r
◆
= 0 (6)
bµ1t
µt
  x
R
  x
 Gv
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4     Examples Bad News.nb
1 Compute stopping policy
Discretize time in periods of dt length, so t 2 {0, dt, 2dt, ...}. Assume tFB and t are on the grid, i.e.,
tFB/dt and t/dt are integers. The probability that a good project succeeds over a period of length dt
is  Gdt. Then the probability that a good project succeeds before time t is: 1  (1   Gdt)
t
dt .
We know that the agent continues for sure until time t. At that point, bµ1t = µ0. Now take bµ1t+dt.
We know what this is, and we want to compute the probability that the agent continues over [t, t+dt]
absent success. Call  tdt the probability that the agent drops over [t, t+ dt] absent success. Then
bµ1t+dt = µ0
h
1  (1   Gdt)
t
dt
i
+ µ0(1   Gdt)
t
dt (1   tdt)
µ0
h
1  (1   Gdt)
t
dt
i
+ (µ0(1   Gdt)
t
dt + 1  µ0)(1   tdt)
Call  t+dtdt the probability that the agent drops over [t + dt, t + 2dt] absent success. Then the
probability that an agent who has a bad project will stay until time t+ 2dt is
(1   tdt)(1   t+dtdt)
Now note that an agent who has a good project and had not succeed d by t and stay d till t+ t
may have succeeded over [t, t + dt], in which case he stays from t + dt on. The prob bility that he
succeeded over that interval is  Gdt. Then the probability that an agent who has a good project and
had not succeeded by time t will stay until t+ 2dt is
(1   tdt)[ Gdt+ (1   Gdt)(1   t+dtdt)]
We compute
bµ1t+2dt = µ0
h
1  (1   Gdt)
t
dt
i
+ µ0(1   Gdt)
t
dt (1   tdt)[ Gdt+ (1   Gdt)(1   t+dtdt)]"
µ0
h
1  (1   Gdt)
t
dt
i
+ µ0(1   Gdt)
t
dt (1   1dt)[ Gdt+ (1   Gdt)(1   t+dtdt)]
+(1  µ0)(1   tdt)(1   t+dtdt)
#
And we can continue doing this for t+ 3dt, etc.
To check: Confirm that as we take dt smaller and smaller, the change in  tdt also gets smaller
and smaller, so these probabilities converge to the continuous time limit. To see this, let  t be defined
as:  t dt = 1, and for t   t,
 t = ⇧
t
⌧=t(1   ⌧dt) = (1   tdt)(1   t+dtdt)(1   t+2dtdt)...(1   t+ndtdt)
for t + ndt = t. Plot  t for di↵erent values of small dt (i.e., plot di↵erent lines on the same graph,
with t on the x-axis, starting at t = t  dt).
1
Figure 2: Effects of an increase in µ0 in the equilibrium of the bad news setting. Parameters are
the same as in Figure 1, with µ′0 = 0.8.
if failure first occurs after the market’s belief has reached µt∗ , given by (7). Observe that
µt∗ is independent of µ0. Hence, once the market’s belief reaches µt∗ , the probability that
the project is bad (1 − µt∗), and thus the expected losses the agent generates by continuing,
are also independent of µ0. An i crease in µ0 however reduces the time that it takes for the
market’s belief to reach µt∗ ; that is, as illustrated in Figure 2, t
∗ decreases with µ0. This
reduction in t∗ has two implications: first, the agent is less likely to fail by t∗, and second, the
losses occur earlier in time and are thus less heavily discounted. As a consequence, both the
probability of a distortion and the present value of the distortion increase when µ0 goes up.
Proposition 2 considers parameters under which the equilibrium features a distortion but
the distortion is not extreme (i.e. −(x − λB)/µ0 > R > −(x − λB)). If instead the agent’s
reputational concern R is small enough that the equilibrium implements the first best (i.e. R <
−(x−λB)), then distortions are zero regardless of µ0 and welfare increases with µ0. Similarly,
if R is large enough that the equilibrium distortion is already extreme (i.e. −(x−λB)/µ0 < R),
then an increase in µ0 has no effect on the behavior of the agent (who never abandons the
project) and the distortion decreases with µ0. Since our interest is in studying the pattern of
distortions, and the effects in the latter case are simply due to a corner solution when R is
too large relative to µ0, we focus on the intermediate case.
The results in Proposition 2 contribute to the discussion mentioned in the Introduction on
how banks’ behavior and distortions vary in good versus bad times. During good times, the
average quality of borrowers is higher than during bad times. However, because the market’s
expectation of loan quality is then higher, banks’ reputational loss from recognizing bad loans
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is also larger.23 Proposition 2 shows that, as a result, career-concerned bank managers will be
more likely to roll over their bad loans during good times compared to bad times. Furthermore,
despite the proportion of bad borrowers being smaller, banks will in expectation accumulate
more bad debt during good times. Consistent with the empirical findings of Schularick and
Taylor (2012), one may say that banks plant the seed for the next crisis during boom periods.
Would information about project quality ameliorate the welfare distortions due to career
concerns? After all, it is because the quality of the project is uncertain that career concerns
lead to distorted behavior. Suppose that it is possible to release a public signal at time 0 that
refines the agent and market’s common prior on the project, µ0. Absent career concerns, the
signal either keeps welfare unchanged — if it does not affect the decision of whether to start the
project at time 0 — or increases welfare — if it does affect this start decision. However, when
the agent is career-concerned, the signal also affects distortions: as implied by Proposition 2,
a high realization of the signal (i.e. a realization that increases µ0) may increase the distortion
relative to first best, whereas a low realization may lower this distortion. We find that the net
welfare effect, and thus the value of information, can be negative.
Proposition 3 (Information in bad news setting). Suppose parameters {µ0, x, λB, R, r} satisfy
−(x−λB)/µ0 > R > −(x−λB) (so the equilibrium features t∗ ∈ (0,∞)) and consider a public
signal that refines µ0 at time 0 while preserving this property and Assumption 1 for all of its
realizations. The signal increases the distortion relative to first best and lowers welfare. If
instead the signal is perfect, it eliminates distortions and increases welfare.
The first part of the proposition considers an imperfect public signal that keeps the first-
best start decision, and thus first-best welfare, unchanged. As in Proposition 2, we focus on
intermediate parameters (i.e. no corner solutions). To illustrate the effects of the signal on
equilibrium welfare, suppose the signal is binary, i.e. it either increases the prior to µh0 > µ0
or lowers it to µ`0 < µ0. Let each realization be unconditionally equally likely, so that µ0 =
1
2
(
µh0 + µ
`
0
)
. Building on our discussion of Proposition 2, the signal realization affects the time
t∗ that it takes for the market’s belief to reach µt∗ , after which the agent is no longer willing to
stop upon failure. The losses that the agent generates once µt∗ is reached are independent of
µ0; what matters is the probability of reaching µt∗ and how heavily the losses are discounted.
The probability of reaching µt∗ is equal to
µ0
µt∗
= 1
2
(
µh0
µt∗
+
µ`0
µt∗
)
and is thus unchanged with the
public signal. However, if t∗(µ0) is the amount of time it takes to reach µt∗ from µ0, then the
losses at µt∗ are discounted by e
−rt∗(µ0), which is a convex function of µ0.
24 This means that the
23Loan quality in reality also depends on the bank’s screening. This discussion assumes that screening does
not fully eliminate differences in loan quality between good and bad times.
24By equation (2), e−rt
∗(µ0) = µ01−µ0
1−µt∗
µt∗
, which is convex in µ0 for a fixed posterior µt∗ .
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public signal increases the expected discounted losses (since 1
2
(e−rt
∗(µh0 ) +e−rt
∗(µ`0)) > e−rt
∗(µ0)),
and as a consequence it reduces welfare.
Things of course are different if the public signal is perfect, as considered in the second
part of Proposition 3. If the signal fully reveals the quality of the project at time 0, the agent’s
actions provide no information to the market. Hence, in this case, a career-concerned agent
has no incentives to distort his behavior, and the distortion relative to first best is eliminated.
Since first-best welfare increases with a fully informative signal, it follows that equilibrium
welfare also increases. Combined with the first part of the proposition, this result implies that
the effects of information are non-monotonic: sufficient information is beneficial, but limited
information is harmful.
Our results have implications for policy, especially when applied to the banking industry.
Governmental authorities conduct supervisory exams on banks to produce information on
expected loan performance, and have the choice of making this information publicly available
or not. Since 2009, the US and Europe incorporated into their supervisory programs the use
of stress tests, which are forward-looking exams with the goal of projecting left-tail risk (e.g.,
Hirtle and Lehnert, 2014). Unlike with more traditional exams, the US requires that the
results of individual banks’ stress tests be publicly disclosed. In Europe, stress test results
were not published in 2009 but public disclosure was required in subsequent years.
There is a current debate among practitioners and scholars on whether the results of banks’
stress tests should be publicly disclosed. Bernanke (2013) argues that disclosure provides
valuable information to market participants and the public and promotes market discipline.
Goldstein and Sapra (2013) also find disclosure beneficial, although they discuss various risks
and challenges associated with disclosure. Our goal is not to assess the different benefits and
costs of disclosing banks’ stress test results, but rather to point out a potential pitfall in the
view that information is always beneficial — a view that seems to be behind much of the
support for stress tests and their public disclosure. Proposition 3 shows that information on
loan quality can be detrimental: when imperfect, this information can exacerbate distortions
due to bank managers’ career concerns and reduce overall welfare.
3 Good news
We contrast the bad news setting of Section 2 with a good news setting in which the agent
learns about project quality from the arrival of a success: λG > λB = 0 > x (with λG+x > 0).
With a slight abuse of notation, we now denote by µt the agent’s belief that the project is
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good at time t given that he has run the project and not succeeded up to t. By Bayes’ rule:
µt =
µ0e
−λGt
µ0e
−λGt + 1− µ0
. (9)
The evolution of this belief is governed by
µ˙t = −µt (1− µt)λG. (10)
As the agent works without succeeding, his belief that the project is good goes down. If at
any time the agent succeeds, his belief jumps up to one.
3.1 First best
Suppose R = 0, so the agent does not have a career concern and maximizes social welfare.
Since a success reveals that the project is good, the first-best solution prescribes continuing
with the project forever after it succeeds. Denote by v the present value of a success, which
is equal to the payoff of 1 plus the present value of continuing working on a good project:
v = 1 + λG+x
r
. Absent success, the agent should continue so long as the expected marginal
benefit of working is larger than the marginal cost, µtλGv ≥ −x, and should stop otherwise.
The first-best stopping belief is then given by
µFB :=
−x
λGv
, (11)
where, recall, x < 0 in this good news setting. We denote by tFB the associated stopping time
(derived from (9) and (11)). Note that by Assumption 1, tFB > 0.
3.2 Career concerns
Suppose now R > 0, so the agent cares not only about the payoff from the project but also
about the market’s belief about project quality. Because an agent with a good project can
succeed whereas one with a bad project cannot, the agent would like to make the market
believe that his project has succeeded.
Arguments analogous to those used in Lemma 1 imply that in any equilibrium, the agent
continues working forever once he has succeeded. Hence, if the agent stops at a time t > 0 in
equilibrium, the market learns that the agent has not succeeded by t, and its belief that the
project is good is equal to µt. Note that this belief is strictly decreasing: the later the agent
stops, the longer is the period of time over which the agent has worked without obtaining
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success, and hence the lower is the market’s belief that the agent’s project is good. The
market’s belief remains constant at µt at all times s > t if the agent stops at t.
Consider next the market’s belief at a time t given that the agent has not stopped by this
time, which we denote by µ̂1t . Since an agent who has succeeded always continues with the
project, this belief is determined by whether and when an agent who has not succeeded stops.
We show that in any equilibrium, the agent must follow a mixed strategy. Suppose to the
contrary that the agent were to follow a pure strategy, where absent success he stops at a
finite time t with certainty. Then if the agent does not stop at t, the market believes that the
agent has succeeded. That is, the market’s belief that the project is good would jump up to
one at t. However, this implies that if the agent was willing to work until time t, he will have
a strict incentive to continue at t, a contradiction. More generally, the agent’s stopping policy
cannot have an atom.
Proposition 4 (Good news setting). The equilibrium is unique up to off-the-equilibrium-path
beliefs. There exist threshold times t > 0 and t ≥ t such that the agent works with certainty
until t, stops with positive probability over [t, t] absent success, and continues otherwise. If
t <∞, the agent stops with certainty by t absent success.
The market’s time-t belief conditional on the agent not having stopped by t evolves contin-
uously and satisfies µ̂1t = µ0 for t ≤ t, µ̂1t ∈ (µ0, 1) for t ∈ (t, t), and µ̂1t = 1 for t ≥ t if t <∞.
The market’s time-t belief conditional on the agent having stopped at s ≤ t is µs for s ∈ [t, t].
For s /∈ [t, t], an off-the-equilibrium-path belief equal to µs supports the equilibrium.
The threshold times satisfy t < ∞ if and only if R < −x/µ0 and t < ∞ if and only if
R < −x. For all parameters, t > tFB.
The equilibrium is characterized by two threshold times, t > tFB and t ≥ t. The agent
always works until t, over-experimenting relative to the first best due to his career concern.
Absent success, the agent then implements a random stopping policy over [t, t]. Figure 3
illustrates the equilibrium beliefs of the agent and the market in an example with intermediate
parameters, where t is finite and t is infinite. Note that in this case, an agent who has not
succeeded continues working with strictly positive probability in the limit as t→∞.
Since the agent follows a randomized stopping time, he must be indifferent absent success
at each time t ∈ [t, t]. That is, the agent’s expected payoff from stopping at t ∈ [t, t] must be
equal to his expected payoff from continuing for an arbitrarily small amount of time dt and
stopping at t+ dt absent success by then:
µtR
r
= µ̂1tRdt+ xdt+ µtλGdtVt + (1− µtλGdt− rdt)
µt+dtR
r
, (12)
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The agent’s indi↵erence condition is now
R
 bµ1t   µt + x+ µt G✓Vt   Rr
◆
= 0. (1)
Since this must hold at each time at which the agent mixes, di↵erentiating this condition
yields b˙µ1tR = µ˙tR  µ˙t G✓Vt   Rr
◆
  µt GV˙t. (2)
We rewrite (??) by substituting with V˙t =  bµ1tR + r (Vt   v), v = 1 +  G+xr , µ˙t =
 µt(1  µt) G, and (??):
b˙µ1tR = [2 Gµt + r    G](bµ1tR + x) + µt (r +  G) ( G  R). (3)
Consider first the case in which R+x > 0 > µ0R+x, so that t is finite and t infinite.
The di↵erential equation has a closed-form solution:
bµ1t = ertKµt(1  µt)µ0(1  µ0)   1rR [µt( G  R)[r +  G(1  µt)] + rx] , (4)
where K is a constant given by the boundary conditions. Substituting (??) into Vt =
v +R
R1
t
e r(s t)bp1sds and integrating yields
Vt = v +
ertKRµt
 Gµ0(1  µ0)
  1
r
[x+ µt( G  R)] .
The value of t depends on µ0. Using the expression for Vt above, K and t can be
found by solving the following system:
bµ1t = µ0, (5)
R(µ0   µt) + x+ µt G
✓
Vt   R
r
◆
= 0. (6)
bµ1t
µt
  x
R
  x
 Gv
1
The agent’s indi↵erence condition is now
R
 bµ1t   µt + x+ µt G✓Vt   Rr
◆
= 0. (1)
Since this must hold at each time at which the agent mixes, di↵erentiating this condition
yields b˙µ1tR = µ˙tR  µ˙t G✓Vt   Rr
◆
  µt GV˙t. (2)
We rewrite (??) by substituting with V˙t =  bµ1tR + r (Vt   v), v = 1 +  G+xr , µ˙t =
 µt(1  µt) G, and (??):
b˙µ1tR = [2 Gµt + r    G](bµ1tR + x) + µt (r +  G) ( G  R). (3)
Consider first the case in which R+x > 0 > µ0R+x, so that t is finite and t infinite.
The di↵erential equation has a closed-form solution:
bµ1t = ertKµt(1  µt)µ0(1  µ0) 1rR [µt( G  R)[r +  G(1  µt)] + rx] , (4)
where K is a constant given by the boundary conditions. Substituting (??) into Vt =
v +R
R1
t
e r(s t)bp1sds and integrating yields
Vt = v +
ertKRµt
 Gµ0(1  µ0)
  1
r
[x+ µt( G  R)] .
The value of t depends on µ0. Using the expression for Vt above, K and t can be
found by solving the following system:
bµ1t = µ0, (5)
R(µ0   µt) + x+ µt G
✓
Vt   R
r
◆
= 0. (6)
bµ1t
µt
  x
R
  x
 Gv
1
Th agen ’s indi↵erence condition is now
R
 bµ1t   µt + x+ µt G✓Vt   Rr
◆
= 0. (1)
Since this must hold at each time at which the agent mixes, di↵erentiating this condition
yields b˙µ1tR = µ˙tR  µ˙t G✓Vt   Rr
◆
  µt GV˙t. (2)
We rewrite (2) by substituting with V˙t =  bµ1tR + r (Vt   v), v = 1 +  G+xr , µ˙t =
 µt(1  µt) G, and (1):
b˙µ1tR = [2 Gµt + r    G](bµ1tR + x) + µt (r +  G) ( G  R). (3)
Consider first the case in which R+x > 0 > µ0R+x, so that t is finite and t infinite.
The di↵erential equation has a closed-form solution:
bµ1t = ertKµt(1  µt)µ0(1  µ0)   1rR [µt( G  R)[r +  G(1  µt)] + rx] , (4)
where K is a constant given by the boundary condi ions. Substituting (4) into Vt =
v +R
R1
t
e r(s t)bp1sds and integrating yields
Vt = v +
ertKRµt
 Gµ0(1  µ0)
  1
r
[x+ µt( G  R)] .
The value of t depends on µ0. Using the expression for Vt above, K and t can be
found by solving the following system:
bµ1t = µ0, (5)
R(µ0   µt) + x+ µt G
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The agent’s indi↵erence condition is now
R
 bµ1t   µt + x+ µt G✓Vt   Rr
◆
= 0. (1)
Since this must hold at each time at which the agent mixes, di↵erentiating this condition
yields b˙µ1tR = µ˙tR  µ˙t G✓Vt   Rr
◆
  µt GV˙t. (2)
We rewrite (2) by substituting with V˙t =  bµ1tR + r (Vt   v), v = 1 +  G+xr , µ˙t =
 µt(1  µt) G, and (1):
b˙µ1tR = [2 Gµt + r    G](bµ1tR + x) + µt (r +  G) ( G  R). (3)
Consider first the case in which R+x > 0 > µ0R+x, so that t is finite and t infinite.
The di↵erential equation has a closed-form solution:
bµ1t = ertKµt(1  µt)µ0(1  µ0)   1rR [µt( G  R)[r +  G(1  µt)] + rx] , (4)
where K is a cons ant given by the boundary conditions. Substi uting (4) into Vt =
v +R
R1
t
e r(s t)bp1sds and integrating yields
Vt = v +
ertKRµt
 Gµ0(1  µ0)
  1
r
[x+ µt( G R)] .
The value of t depends on µ0. Using the expression for Vt above, K and t can be
found by solving the following system:
bµ1t = µ0, (5)
R(µ0   µt) + x+ µt G
✓
Vt   R
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◆
= 0. (6)
bµ1t
µt
 x
R
 x
 Gv
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The agent’s indi↵erence condition is now
R
 bµ1t   µt + x+ µt G✓Vt   Rr
◆
= 0. (1)
Since this must hold at each time at which the agent mixes, di↵erentiating this condition
yields b˙µ1tR = µ˙tR  µ˙t G✓Vt   Rr
◆
  µt GV˙t. (2)
We rewrite (2) by substituting with V˙t =  bµ1tR + r (Vt   v), v = 1 +  G+xr , µ˙t =
 µt(1  µt) G, and (1):
b˙µ1tR = [2 Gµt + r    G](bµ1tR + x) + µt (r +  G) ( G  R). (3)
Consider first the case in which R+x > 0 > µ0R+x, so that t is finite and t infinite.
The di↵erential equation has a closed-form solution:
bµ1t = ertKµt(1  µt)µ0(1  µ0)   1rR [µt( G  R)[r +  G(1  µt)] + rx] , (4)
where K is a constant given by the boundary conditions. Substituting (4) into Vt =
v +R
R1
t
e r(s t)bp1sds and integrating yields
Vt = v +
ertKRµt
 Gµ0(1  µ0)
  1
r
[x+ µt( G  R)] .
The value of t depends on µ0. Using the expression for Vt above, K and t can be
found by solving the following system:
bµ1t = µ0, (5)
R(µ0   µt) + x+ µt G
✓
Vt   R
r
◆
= 0. (6)
tFB
t
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The agent’s indi↵erence condition is now
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 bµ1t   µt + x+ µt G✓Vt   Rr
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= 0. (1)
Since this must hold at each time at which the agent mixes, di↵erentiating this condition
yields b˙µ1tR = µ˙tR  µ˙t G✓Vt   Rr
◆
  µt GV˙t. (2)
We rewrite (2) by substituting with V˙t =  bµ1tR + r (Vt   v), v = 1 +  G+xr , µ˙t =
 µt(1  µt) G, and (1):
b˙µ1tR = [2 Gµt + r    G](bµ1tR + x) + µt (r +  G) ( G  R). (3)
Consider first the case in which R+x > 0 > µ0R+x, so that t is finite and t infinite.
The di↵erential equation has a closed-form solution:
bµ1t = ertKµt(1  µt)µ0(1  µ0)   1rR [µt( G  R)[r +  G(1  µt)] + rx] , (4)
where K is a constant given by the boundary conditions. Substituting (4) into Vt =
v +
R1
t
e r(s t)bp1sds and integrating yields
Vt = v +
ertKRµt
 Gµ0(1  µ0)
  1
r
[x+ µt( G  R)] .
The value of t depends on µ0. Using the expression for Vt above, K and t can be
found by solving the following system:
bµ1t = µ0, (5)
R(µ0   µt) + x+ µt G
✓
Vt   R
r
◆
= 0. (6)
tFB
t
1
The agent’s indi↵erence condition is now
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 bµ1t   µt + x+ µt G✓Vt   Rr
◆
= 0. (1)
Since this m st hold at each time at which the agent mi es, di↵erentiating this condition
yields b˙µ1tR = µ˙tR  µ˙t G✓Vt   Rr
◆
  µt GV˙t. (2)
We rewrite (2) by substituting with V˙t =  bµ1t + r (Vt   v), v = 1 +  G+xr , µ˙t =
 µt(1  µt) G, and (1):
b˙µ1tR = [2 Gµt + r    G](bµ1tR + x) + µt (r +  G) ( G  R). (3)
Consider first the case in which R x > 0 > µ0R+x, so that t is finite and t infinite.
The di↵erential equation has a closed-form solution:
bµ1t = ertKµt(1  µt)µ0(1  µ0)   1rR [µt( G R)[r +  G(1  µt)] + rx] , (4)
where K is a constant given by he boundary conditions. Substituting (4) into Vt =
v +R
R1
t
e r(s t)bp1sds and integrating yields
Vt = v +
ertKRµt
 Gµ0(1  µ0)
  1
r
[x+ µt( G  R)] .
The value of t depends on µ0. Using he expression for Vt above, K and t can be
found by solving the following system:
bµ1t = µ0, (5)
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✓
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Figure 3: Beliefs and threshold times in the equilibrium of the good news setting. Parameters are
µ0 = 0.5, x = −0.8, λG = 6, R = 0.9, and r = 1.
where Vt = v + R
∫∞
t
e−r(s−t)µ̂1sds and we are ignoring (dt)
2 terms. Furthermore, since this
condition must hold at each time t ∈ [t, t], it must be that at each such time, the agent is also
indifferent between stopping and continuing all the way until time t absent success. In the
proof of Proposition 4, we show that the agent’s indifference conditions pin down t and t and
the market’s belief µ̂1t . We relegate the details to the Appendix.
A suitable application of this good news setting may be to venture capital, where an en-
trepreneur learns about the quality of a project from the arrival of a breakthrough. Analogous
to our characterization of the bad news setting, we find that a career-concerned entrepreneur
keeps the project for too long relative to the first best. Note that since the entrepreneur keeps
getting pessimistic as ime passes without success, he requires increasing reputation benefits
not to abandon the project. This explains why the market’s belief conditional on the agent
continuing, µ̂1t , must be increasing over time.
There are interesting differences between the good news and bad news settings with regards
to how the agent and market’s beliefs compare. Recall that in the equilibrium of the bad news
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setting, the agent follows a pure strategy, abandoning the project if and only if a failure arrives
before a date t∗. The agent’s actions are fully responsive to news up to t∗ and unresponsive
from t∗ on; as a result, the agent and market’s beliefs coincide up to t∗ and diverge from t∗ on.
In contrast, in the equilibrium of the good news setting, the agent’s actions are unresponsive
to news up to t and partially responsive from t on, when the agent starts quitting with positive
probability absent success. Here the agent and market’s beliefs diverge from time 0 up to t and
converge from t on, coinciding only when either the agent stops or a finite time t is reached.
Finally, similar to our analysis in Section 2, we can consider the market’s belief that the
agent has succeeded by time t given that the agent has not stopped by t. In the first best,
this belief is increasing until the first-best stopping time tFB and constant at one from that
time on. In the presence of career concerns, this belief is also increasing: it increases strictly
at all t ≤ t, and is constant at one from t on when t¯ is finite. Thus, unlike under bad news
learning, here the market becomes more optimistic about the outcomes of the agent’s project
as time passes without the agent stopping.
Corollary 3. The market’s belief that the agent has succeeded conditional on the agent not
having stopped is increasing over time.
3.3 Expected quality and information
The welfare effects of career concerns follow directly from our equilibrium characterization in
Proposition 4. The larger is the weight R that the agent places on his reputation, the longer he
will delay quitting the project in the absence of success. Consequently, the distortion relative
to first best increases, and welfare decreases, with the agent’s career concern.
We next study how expected project quality and information about quality affect distor-
tions and welfare. Recall that in the bad news setting, we focused our attention on the case
in which the agent’s career concern is intermediate: the agent would prefer to continue with
the project after failing if that gives him a full reputation benefit of R, but would prefer to
stop upon failure if the reputation benefit is only given by the prior µ0R. For comparison, we
focus here on the analogous case, namely the case in which the agent would always prefer to
continue absent success if that gives him a reputation benefit of R, but would prefer to stop
if enough time has passed without success and continuing only gives him a reputation benefit
of µ0R. We obtain:
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Proposition 5 (Expected quality and information in good news setting). Suppose parameters
{µ0, x, λG, R, r} satisfy −x/µ0 > R > −x (so the equilibrium features t < ∞ and t = ∞).
Consider changes in µ0 and public signals that refine µ0 at time 0, both preserving this property
and Assumption 1. Welfare increases with µ0 and with any such signal. Furthermore, there
exist parameters for which the distortion relative to first best decreases with µ0 and with the
signal. If the signal is perfect, it eliminates distortions.
Consider the effects of an increase in µ0, which are illustrated in Figure 4. As in the
bad news setting of Section 2, welfare increases with µ0, but, unlike in that setting, here the
distortion relative to first best can decrease with µ0. To see why, note that the distortion in
this good news setting is given by the expected losses the agent generates by continuing after
his belief has reached µFB, given by (11). On the one hand, we find that if µ0 increases, the
agent stops more slowly after reaching µFB, so he generates larger losses in expectation. On
the other hand, an increase in µ0 also increases the time that it takes for the agent’s belief to
reach µFB; that is, as shown in Figure 4, tFB is increasing in µ0. Analogous to our discussion
of Proposition 2, but now with the opposite implication, this has two effects: first, the agent
is more likely to succeed by tFB, and second, losses occur later in time and are thus more
heavily discounted. Both of these effects imply that distortions decrease when µ0 increases;
furthermore, we show that these effects can dominate.
Regarding information, Proposition 5 shows that, unlike in the bad news setting, here
releasing a public signal about project quality at time 0 always increases welfare, even if the
signal is imperfect. Moreover, distortions may decline with an imperfect signal. Roughly, the
main reason for the latter is that the effects of µ0 on the agent’s stopping policy are concave:
a reduction in µ0 increases the probability with which an unsuccessful agent stops by time
t > tFB by more than what an increase in µ0 lowers it. As for the effects on welfare, note
that a signal about project quality always increases first-best welfare: while the decision to
start the project may not change, the signal allows the agent to adjust the stopping time tFB
to avoid quitting too early or too late. Proposition 5 reveals that even if distortions were to
increase with information, the effects on first-best welfare dominate. Therefore, the effects of
information on equilibrium welfare are always positive when learning is from good news.
Returning to the application to venture capital, our results suggest a pattern of distortions
that contrasts with that of the banking industry. We find that career-concerned entrepreneurs
investing in innovation projects may generate smaller distortions during good times, when the
expected quality of projects is relatively high, compared to bad times. Furthermore, no matter
how imperfect, public information about the prospects of innovation opportunities is always
beneficial.
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The agent’s indi↵erence condition is now
R
 bµ1t   µt + x+ µt G✓Vt   Rr
◆
= 0. (1)
Since this must hold at each time at which the agent mixes, di↵erentiating this condition
yields b˙µ1tR = µ˙tR  µ˙t G✓Vt   Rr
◆
  µt GV˙t. (2)
We rewrite (??) by substituting with V˙t =  bµ1tR + r (Vt   v), v = 1 +  G+xr , µ˙t =
 µt(1  µt) G, and (??):
b˙µ1tR = [2 Gµt + r    G](bµ1tR + x) + µt (r +  G) ( G  R). (3)
Consider first the case in which R+x > 0 > µ0R+x, so that t is finite and t infinite.
The di↵erential equation has a closed-form solution:
bµ1t = ertKµt(1  µt)µ0(1  µ0)   1rR [µt( G  R)[r +  G(1  µt)] + rx] , (4)
where K is a constant given by the boundary conditions. Substituting (??) into Vt =
v +R
R1
t
e r(s t)bp1sds and integrating yields
Vt = v +
ertKRµt
 Gµ0(1  µ0)
  1
r
[x+ µt( G  R)] .
The value of t depends on µ0. Using the expression for Vt above, K and t can be
found by solving the following system:
bµ1t = µ0, (5)
R(µ0   µt) + x+ µt G
✓
Vt   R
r
◆
= 0. (6)
bµ1t
µt
  x
R
  x
 Gv
1
The agent’s indi↵erence condition is now
R
 bµ1t   µt + x+ µt G✓Vt   Rr
◆
= 0. (1)
Since this must hold at each time at which the agent mixes, di↵erentiating this condition
yields b˙µ1tR = µ˙tR  µ˙t G✓Vt   Rr
◆
  µt GV˙t. (2)
We rewrite (??) by substituting with V˙t =  bµ1tR + r (Vt   v), v = 1 +  G+xr , µ˙t =
 µt(1  µt) G, and (??):
b˙µ1tR = [2 Gµt + r    G](bµ1tR + x) + µt (r +  G) ( G  R). (3)
Consider first the case in which R+x > 0 > µ0R+x, so that t is finite and t infinite.
The di↵erential equation has a closed-form solution:
bµ1t = ertKµt(1  µt)µ0(1  µ0) 1rR [µt( G  R)[r +  G(1  µt)] + rx] , (4)
where K is a constant given by the boundary conditions. Substituting (??) into Vt =
v +R
R1
t
e r(s t)bp1sds and integrating yields
Vt = v +
ertKRµt
 Gµ0(1  µ0)
  1
r
[x+ µt( G  R)] .
The value of t depends on µ0. Using the expression for Vt above, K and t can be
found by solving the following system:
bµ1t = µ0, (5)
R(µ0   µt) + x+ µt G
✓
Vt   R
r
◆
= 0. (6)
bµ1t
µt
  x
R
  x
 Gv
1
The agent’s indi↵erence condition is now
R
 bµ1t   µt + x+ µt G✓Vt   Rr
◆
= 0. (1)
Since this must hold at each time at which the agent mixes, di↵erentiating this condition
yields b˙µ1tR = µ˙tR  µ˙t G✓Vt   Rr
◆
  µt GV˙t. (2)
We rewrite (2) by substituting with V˙t =  bµ1R + r (Vt   v), v = 1 +  G+xr , µ˙t =
 µt(1  µt) G, and (1):
b˙µ1tR = [2 Gµt + r    G](bµ1tR + x) + µt (r +  G) ( G  R). (3)
Consider first the case in which R+x > 0 > µ0R+x, so that t is finite and t infinite.
The di↵erential equation has a closed-form solution:
bµ1t = ertKµt(1  µt)µ0(1  µ0)   1rR [µt( G  R)[r +  G(1  µt)] + rx] , (4)
where K is a constant given by the boundary conditions. Substituting (4) into Vt =
v +R
R1
t
e r(s t)bp1sds and integrating yields
Vt = v +
ertKRµt
 Gµ0(1  µ0)
  1
r
[x+ µt( G  R)] .
The value of t depends on µ0. Using the expression for Vt above, K and t can be
found by solving the following system:
bµ1t = µ0, (5)
R(µ0   µt) + x+ µt G
✓
Vt   R
r
◆
= 0. (6)
bµ1t
µt
 x
R
 x
 Gv
1
Th agen ’s indi↵erence condition is now
R
 bµ1t   µt + x+ µt G✓Vt   Rr
◆
= 0. (1)
Since this must hold at each time at which the agent mixes, di↵erentiating this condition
yields b˙µ1tR = µ˙tR  µ˙t G✓Vt   Rr
◆
  µt GV˙t. (2)
We rewrite (2) by substituting with V˙t =  bµ1tR + r (Vt   v), v = 1 +  G+xr , µ˙t =
 µt(1  µt) G, and (1):
b˙µ1tR = [2 Gµt + r    G](bµ1tR + x) + µt (r +  G) ( G  R). (3)
Consider first the case in which R+x > 0 > µ0R+x, so that t is finite and t infinite.
The di↵erential equation has a closed-form solution:
bµ1t = ertKµt(1  µt)µ0(1  µ0)   1rR [µt( G  R)[r + G(1  µt)] + rx] , (4)
where K is a constant given by the boundary condi ions. Substituting (4) into Vt =
v +R
R1
t
e r(s t)bp1sds and integrating yields
Vt = v +
ertKRµt
 Gµ0(1  µ0)
  1
r
[x+ µt( G  R)] .
The value of t depends on µ0. Using the expression for Vt above, K and t can be
found by solving the following system:
bµ1t = µ0, (5)
R(µ0   µt) + x+ µt G
✓
Vt   R
r
◆
= 0. (6)
bµ1t
µt
 x
R
x
 Gv
1
The agent’s indi↵erence condition is now
R
 bµ1t   µt + x+ µt G✓Vt   Rr
◆
= 0. (1)
Since this m st hold at each time at which the agent mi es, di↵erentiating this condition
yields b˙µ1tR = µ˙tR  µ˙t G✓Vt   Rr
◆
  µt GV˙t. (2)
We rewrite (2) by substituting with V˙t =  bµ1tR + r (Vt   v), v = 1 +  G+xr , µ˙t =
 µt(1  µt) G, and (1):
b˙µ1tR = [2 Gµt + r    G](bµ1tR + x) + µt (r +  G) ( G  R). (3)
Consider first the case in which R x > 0 > µ0R+x, so that t is finite and t infinite.
The di↵erential equation has a closed-form solution:
bµ1t = ertKµt(1  µt)µ0(1  µ0)   1rR [µt( G  R)[r +  G(1  µt)] + rx] , (4)
where K is a constant given by the boundary conditions. Substituting (4) into Vt =
v +R
R1
t
e r(s t)bp1sds and integrating yields
Vt = v +
ertKRµt
 Gµ0(1  µ0)
  1
r
[x+ µt( G  R)] .
The value of t depends on µ0. Using the expression for Vt above, K and t can be
found by solving the following system:
bµ1t = µ0, (5)
R(µ0   µt) + x+ µt G
✓
Vt   R
r
◆
= 0. (6)
µ0 µ
0
0 µ
00
0
1
The agent’s indi↵erence condition is now
R
 bµ1t   µt + x+ µt G✓Vt   Rr
◆
= 0. (1)
Since this must hold at each time at whic the agent mixes, di↵erentiating this condition
yields b˙µ1tR = µ˙tR  µ˙t G✓Vt   Rr
◆
  µt GV˙t. (2)
We rewrite (2) by substituting with V˙t =  bµ1tR + r (Vt   v), v = 1 +  G+xr , µ˙t =
 µt(1  µt) G, and (1):
b˙µ1tR = [2 Gµt + r    G](bµ1tR + x) + µt (r +  G) ( G  R). (3)
Consider first the case in which R+x > 0 > µ0R+x, so that t is finite and t infinite.
The di↵erential equation has a closed-form solution:
bµ1t = ertKµt(1  µt)µ0(1  µ0)   1rR [µt( G  R)[r +  G(1  µt)] + rx] , (4)
where K is a c nsta t given by the boundary conditions. Substituting (4) into Vt =
v +R
R1
t
e r(s t)bp1sds and integrating yields
Vt = v +
ertKRµt
 Gµ0(1  µ0)
  1
r
[x+ µt( G  R)] .
The alue of t depends on µ0. Using the expression for Vt above, K and t can be
found by solving the following system:
bµ1t = µ0, (5)
R(µ0   µt) + x+ µt G
✓
Vt   R
r
◆
= 0. (6)
µ0 µ
0
0 µ
00
0
1
The agent’s indi↵erence condition is now
R
 bµ1t   µt + x+ µt G✓Vt   Rr
◆
= 0. (1)
Since this must hold at each time at which the agent mixes, di↵erentiating this condition
yields b˙µ1tR = µ˙tR  µ˙t G✓Vt   Rr
◆
  µt GV˙t. (2)
We rewrite (2) by substituting with V˙t =  bµ1tR + r (Vt   v), v = 1 +  G+xr , µ˙t =
 µt(1  µt) G, and (1):
b˙µ1tR = [2 Gµt + r    G](bµ1tR + x) + µt (r +  G) ( G  R). (3)
Consider first the case in which R+x > 0 > µ0R+x, so that t is fin te and t infinite.
The di↵erential equation has a closed-form solution:
bµ1t = ertKµt(1  µt)µ0(1  µ0)   1rR [µt( G  R)[r +  G(1  µt)] + rx] , (4)
where K is a constant given by the boundary conditions. Substituting (4) into Vt =
v +R
R1
t
e r(s t)bp1sds and in egrating yields
Vt = v +
ertKRµt
 Gµ0(1  µ0)
  1
r
[x+ µt( G  R)] .
The value of t depends on µ0. Using the expression for Vt above, K and t can be
found by solving the following system:
bµ1t = µ0, (5)
R(µ0   µt) + x+ µt G
✓
Vt   R
r
◆
= 0. (6)
tFB
t
1
The agent’s indi↵erence condition is now
R
 bµ1t   µt + x+ µt G✓Vt   Rr
◆
= 0. (1)
Since this must hold at each time at which the agent mixes, di↵erentiating this condition
yields b˙µ1tR = µ˙t   µ˙t G✓Vt   Rr
◆
  µt GV˙t. (2)
We rewrite (2) by substituting with V˙t =  bµ1tR + r (Vt   v), v = 1 +  G+xr , µ˙t =
 µt(1  µt) G, and (1):
b˙µ1tR = [2 Gµt + r    G](bµ1tR + x) + µt (r +  G) ( G  R). (3)
Consider first the case in which R+x > 0 > µ0R+x, so that t is finite and t infinite.
The di↵erential equation has a closed-form solution:
bµ1t = ertKµt(1  µt)µ0(1  µ0)   1rR [µt( G  R)[r +  G(1  µt)] + rx] , (4)
where K is a constant given by the boundary conditions. Substituting (4) into Vt =
v +
R1
t
e r(s t)bp1sds and integrating yields
Vt = v +
ertKRµt
 Gµ0(1  µ0)
  1
r
[x+ µt( G  R)] .
The value of t depends on µ0. Using the expression for Vt above, K and t can be
found by solving the following system:
bµ1t = µ0, (5)
R(µ0   µt) + x+ µt G
✓
Vt   R
r
◆
= 0. (6)
tFB
t
1
Figure 4: Effects of an increase in µ0 in the equilibrium of the good news setting. Parameters are
the same as in Figure 3, with µ′0 = 0.75.
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A Appendix
This Appendix contains the proofs of the results stated in Section 2; the proofs of the results
in Section 3 are in the Internet Appendix. We introduce some notation: we denote by µ̂0t the
market’s belief that the project is good at time t conditional on the agent stopping at this
time. Note that if the agent stops at t, the market’s belief is µ̂0t for all s ≥ t. As in the text,
we denote by µ̂1t the market’s time-t belief that the project is good conditional on the agent
not having stopped by t. To simplify the exposition, in what follows we will disregard the
almost surely qualification that would account for probability zero events.
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A.1 Proof of Lemma 1
We prove the lemma by proving two claims:
Claim 1: Suppose there exists an equilibrium in which an agent who has not failed by t > 0
stops with strictly positive probability by t. Then the agent stops with certainty at a time t′ ≤ t.
Proof of Claim 1: Suppose the claim is not true. Then there exists an equilibrium in which the
agent, not having failed by t, mixes over a time interval [t′, t′ + dt] with dt arbitrarily close to
zero and t′+ dt ≤ t. Since the market’s belief is left-continuous, this agent must be indifferent
between stopping and continuing at t′. Now note that for any fixed continuation strategy in
which the agent continues at t′, the expected continuation payoff is strictly larger for an agent
who has not failed than for an agent who has failed by t′. On the other hand, the expected
payoff from stopping at t′ is the same for both types of the agent. Thus, if the agent who has
not failed is indifferent at t′, the agent who has failed has strict incentives to stop and stops
with probability one by t′. Bayes’ rule then yields that the market’s belief that the agent has
not failed by t′ upon observing that he continues at t′ is one, which implies µ̂1t′ ≥ µ̂0t′ .
Given these market’s beliefs, the agent has a continuation strategy upon continuing at
t′ that gives him an expected reputation payoff no smaller than µ̂1t′R/r. Furthermore, note
that the expected project payoff from any such continuation strategy is strictly positive for
an agent who has not failed; this follows from x − (1 − µt′)λB > 0 by Assumption 1 and
µt′ > µ0. Therefore, the total expected continuation payoff for an agent who has not failed by
t′ is strictly larger than µ̂1t′R/r if the agent continues with the project at t
′, and it is equal to
µ̂0t′R/r ≤ µ̂1t′R/r if the agent stops at t′. It follows that this agent cannot be indifferent at t′,
yielding a contradiction.
Claim 2: There exists no equilibrium in which the agent stops with certainty at a time t′ > 0
by which he has not failed.
Proof of Claim 2: The proof of this claim is analogous to that of Claim 1 above. The difference
is that if an agent who has not failed stops with certainty at a time t′ > 0, then by the
arguments above, there is no history following which the agent continues with the project
at t′. Hence, the market’s belief upon observing that the agent continues at t′ is off the
equilibrium path. However, note that by our belief monotonicity refinement, we must have
µ̂1t′ ≥ µ̂0t′ . The rest of the proof is identical to that of Claim 1.
A.2 Proof of Proposition 1
We begin by showing existence under the different parameter conditions considered in the
proposition. We then prove uniqueness.
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Existence. Suppose first R ≤ −(x−λB). Consider an equilibrium in which the agent starts
the project at time 0 and stops at time t > 0 if and only if he fails at t. Let the market’s
belief that the project is good at time t ≥ 0 be µ0 if the agent has not started the project, 0
if the agent has started and stopped by t, and µt if the agent has started and not stopped by
t. Clearly, these beliefs are consistent (and on the equilibrium path), and by the arguments
in the text the agent’s stopping decision at each t > 0 is optimal. All is left to be shown is
that it is optimal for the agent to start the project. The agent’s expected payoff if he does not
start is µ0R/r. The agent’s expected payoff if he starts and follows the proposed strategy is
µ0
∫ ∞
0
e−rt (x+ µtR) dt+ (1− µ0)
∫ ∞
0
e−(r+λB)t (x+ µtR− λB) dt
≥
∫ ∞
0
e−rt [x− (1− µ0)λB + µtR] dt
>
µ0R
r
.
The first inequality follows from the agent’s stopping strategy at t > 0 being optimal given
the market’s beliefs (and thus yielding a larger expected payoff than a strategy of working
forever). The second inequality follows from Assumption 1 and the fact that µt > µ0 for all
t > 0. Hence, we obtain that the payoff from starting the project and following the equilibrium
strategy is larger than that from not starting the project.
Suppose next R > −(x − λB). Consider an equilibrium in which the agent starts the
project at time 0 and stops at time t > 0 if and only if he fails at t and t < t∗, where t∗ is
given by (7) if R < −(x− λB)/µ0 and t∗ = 0 otherwise. Let the market’s belief at time t ≥ 0
be µ0 if the agent has not started the project, 0 if the agent has started and stopped by t,
µt if the agent has started and not stopped by t and t ≤ t∗, and µt∗ if the agent has started
and not stopped by t and t > t∗. Clearly, on-the-equilibrium-path beliefs are consistent and
off-the-equilibrium-path beliefs satisfy our belief monotonicity refinement. Moreover, by the
arguments in the text, the agent’s stopping decision at each t > 0 is optimal. Finally, an
analogous argument to that above implies that it is optimal for the agent to start the project
at time 0.
Uniqueness. We proceed by proving three claims.
Claim 1: An equilibrium in which the agent does not start the project at time 0 does not exist.
Proof of Claim 1: Suppose by contradiction that such an equilibrium exists. Recall that the
agent has no private information at time 0; hence, the market’s beliefs cannot change upon
observing the agent’s start decision. It follows that the agent has a continuation strategy upon
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starting the project which gives him an expected reputation payoff no smaller than µ0R/r.
Moreover, as argued in the proof of Lemma 1, the agent’s expected project payoff from any
such continuation strategy is strictly positive. Therefore, the agent’s expected payoff from
starting the project at time 0 is strictly larger than µ0R/r, which is his payoff from not
starting. Contradiction.
Claim 2: In any equilibrium, if the agent fails at a time t′ > 0, he either stops at t′ with
certainty or continues with the project at all t ≥ t′.
Proof of Claim 2: Suppose the claim is not true. Then there exist t′ > 0 and dt > 0 such
that the agent stops with strictly positive probability on the interval (t′, t′ + dt] when having
failed by t′. By Lemma 1, the market’s belief conditional on the agent not having stopped
is weakly increasing. Moreover, for dt arbitrarily small, Bayes’ rule implies that this belief is
strictly increasing over (t′, t′ + dt]. This means that the agent’s expected reputation payoff
from continuing at t ∈ (t′, t′+dt] is strictly larger than that from continuing at t′. Additionally,
for an agent who has failed by t′, the expected project payoff is the same when continuing at
any t ≥ t′. Finally, by Lemma 1, the payoff from stopping at t ∈ (t′, t′ + dt] is zero and thus
no larger than the payoff from stopping at t′. It follows that if the agent is willing to stop over
(t′, t′ + dt], he has strict incentives to stop at t′, yielding a contradiction.
Claim 3: In any equilibrium, the agent’s strategy and the market’s beliefs must be as described
in the proposition.
Proof of Claim 3: The equilibrium strategy of the agent follows from Lemma 1, Claims 1 and
2 above, and the arguments in the text. Given the agent’s strategy, Bayes’ rule then pins
down µ̂1t for all t ≥ 0 and µ̂0t for t < t∗. We now show that the market’s belief must satisfy
µ̂0t = 0 for t ≥ t∗. First, note that µ̂0t cannot jump at t∗: if it did, an agent who fails at t < t∗
arbitrarily close to t∗ would prefer to continue at t and stop at t∗, yielding a contradiction.
Since µ̂0t = 0 for t < t
∗, it follows that µ̂0t∗ = 0. Second, note that the agent is indifferent
between stopping and continuing upon failing at t∗, and the market’s belief conditional on the
agent continuing is µ̂1t = µt∗ for all t ≥ t∗. Thus, if µ̂0t′ > 0 for some t′ > t∗, an agent who fails
at t′ strictly prefers to stop at that time, yielding another contradiction. The claim follows.
A.3 Proof of Proposition 2
Equations (2) and (7) yield t∗ = 1
λB
log
(
−(1−µ0)(x−λB)
µ0(R+x−λB)
)
. The derivative with respect to µ0 is
dt∗
dµ0
= − 1
λBµ0(1− µ0)
. (13)
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The distortion relative to first best is
SFB0 − S0(t∗) = (1− µ0)(x− λB)e−(r+λB)t
∗
(
1
r + λB
− 1
r
)
. (14)
The derivative with respect to µ0 is
d(SFB0 − S0(t∗))
dµ0
= −(x− λB)e−(r+λB)t∗
(
1
r + λB
− 1
r
)[
1 + (1− µ0)(r + λB)
dt∗
dµ0
]
. (15)
Hence, the distortion is strictly increasing in µ0 if and only if
dt∗
dµ0
< − 1
(1−µ0)(r+λB) , or, equiva-
lently, substituting with (13),
− 1
λBµ0(1− µ0)
< − 1
(1− µ0)(r + λB)
.
This inequality is always satisfied since µ0 < 1 and r > 0.
Finally, we show that equilibrium welfare S0(t
∗) is strictly increasing in µ0. Differentiating
S0(t
∗) given in (8) with respect to µ0 yields
dS0(t
∗)
dµ0
=
x
r
− (x− λB)
(
1− e−(λB+r)t∗
λB + r
+
e−(λB+r)t
∗
r
)
− λB(1− µ0)(x− λB)e
−(λB+r)t∗
r
dt∗
dµ0
.
Substituting with (13) and rearranging terms,
dS0(t
∗)
dµ0
=
x
r
− (x− λB)µ0r − e
−(λB+r)t∗(λB(1− µ0) + r)
(λB + r)µ0r
. (16)
Suppose by contradiction that S0(t
∗) is decreasing in µ0. Given (16), this requires
x ≤ (x− λB)µ0r − e
−(λB+r)t∗(λB(1− µ0) + r)
(λB + r)µ0
.
Recall that x − λB < 0. It follows that this condition can hold only if the left-hand side is
smaller than the right-hand side when t∗ = 0, i.e. only if
x ≤ −(x− λB)(λB + r)(1− µ0)
(λB + r)µ0
.
However, this requires x − (1 − µ0)λB ≤ 0, which violates Assumption 1. Hence, S0(t∗) is
strictly increasing in µ0.
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A.4 Proof of Proposition 3
Consider the first part of the proposition. Recall that the distortion relative to first best is
given by (14). Proposition 2 shows that this distortion is increasing in µ0. Moreover, note
that first-best welfare is unchanged with the signal given that starting the project is efficient
for all of its realizations. (This follows from the fact that first-best welfare, given by (4), is
linear in µ0.) To prove the first part of the proposition, it is therefore sufficient to show that
the distortion is convex in µ0. Differentiating (15) yields
d2(SFB0 − S0(t∗))
dµ20
= 2(x− λB)e−(r+λB)t∗
(
1
r + λB
− 1
r
)
(r + λB)
dt∗
dµ0
+(1− µ0)(x− λB)e−(r+λB)t
∗
(
1
r + λB
− 1
r
)
(r + λB)
2
(
dt∗
dµ0
)2
−(1− µ0)(x− λB)e−(r+λB)t
∗
(
1
r + λB
− 1
r
)
(r + λB)
d2t∗
dµ20
.
Hence,
d2(SFB0 − S0(t∗))
dµ20
> 0 ⇐⇒ 2 dt
∗
dµ0
+ (1− µ0)(r + λB)
(
dt∗
dµ0
)2
− (1− µ0)
d2t∗
dµ20
> 0. (17)
Differentiating (13) yields
d2t∗
dµ20
=
λB(1− 2µ0)
[λBµ0(1− µ0)]2
. (18)
Substituting (13) and (18) in (17) and rearranging terms yields that
d2(SFB0 −S0(t∗))
dµ20
> 0 if and
only if
− 2
λBµ0(1− µ0)
+
(1− µ0)(r + λB)
[λBµ0(1− µ0)]2
− (1− µ0)λB(1− 2µ0)
[λBµ0(1− µ0)]2
> 0,
which reduces to (1− µ0)r > 0 and is thus always satisfied.
Consider next the second part of the proposition. If the signal reveals a good project, it is
efficient to continue forever and there are no distortions. If the signal reveals a bad project,
it is efficient to not start the project. Since the agent’s actions reveal no information, the
career-concerned agent has no incentives to start, so again there are no distortions. It follows
that a fully informative signal eliminates distortions relative to first best. Since first-best
welfare increases with a fully informative signal (as losses are avoided when the project is
bad), equilibrium welfare increases.
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B Internet Appendix
This Internet Appendix contains the proofs of the results stated in Section 3 of the paper.
B.1 Proof of Proposition 4
We begin by examining the agent’s indifference conditions. We then describe the equilibrium
construction and show existence under the different parameter conditions considered in the
proposition. Finally, we prove uniqueness.
Indifference conditions. Consider the agent’s indifference condition (12) for each t ∈ [t, t].
Writing µt+dt = µt + dtµ˙t = µt − µt(1 − µt)λGdt, dividing by dt both sides of the equation,
and taking dt to zero, this condition can be rewritten as
R
(
µ̂1t − µt
)
+ x+ µtλG
(
Vt − R
r
)
= 0, (19)
where Vt = v + R
∫∞
t
e−r(s−t)µ̂1sds. Since (19) holds at each t ∈ [t, t], the agent must be
indifferent between stopping and continuing until t absent success. For t <∞, the agent stops
at t if he has not succeeded and continues forever otherwise. Thus, for each t ∈ [t, t],
µtR = (x+ µtλG)
(
1− e−r(t−t)
)
+ rR
∫ t
t
e−r(s−t)µ̂1sds
+e−r(t−t)
{
µt
(
1− e−λG(t−t)
)
(x+ λG +R) +
[
µte
−λG(t−t) + 1− µt
]
µtR
}
. (20)
Differentiating this condition yields
µ˙tR = µ˙tλG
(
1− e−r(t−t)
)
− r (x+ µtλG) e−r(t−t) − rR
[
µ̂1t − r
∫ t
t
e−r(s−t)µ̂1sds
]
+re−r(t−t)
[
µt
(
1− e−λG(t−t)
)
(x+ λG +R) +
(
µte
−λG(t−t) + 1− µt
)
µtR
]
+e−r(t−t)

[
µ˙t
(
1− e−λG(t−t)
)
− µtλGe−λG(t−t)
]
(x+ λG +R)
+
[
µtλGe
−λG(t−t) − µ˙t
(
1− e−λG(t−t)
)]
µtR
 .
Substituting with equation (20), writing µ˙t = −µt(1− µt)λG, and rearranging terms yields
µ̂1t =
1
rR
 r [−x− µt(λG −R)]− µt(1− µt)λG
[
λG
(
1− e−r(t−t)
)
−R
]
−e−r(t−t)µtλG
[
1− µt
(
1− e−λG(t−t)
)]
[x+ λG +R(1− µt)]
 . (21)
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Existence under −x < R < −x/µ0. We construct an equilibrium as described in the
proposition in which t ∈ (tFB,∞) and t =∞. Equations (20) and (21) reduce to
µtR = x+ µtλG + rR
∫ ∞
t
e−r(s−t)µ̂1sds, (22)
µ̂1t =
1
rR
{
r [−x− µt(λG −R)]− µt(1− µt)λG (λG −R)
}
, (23)
for each t ≥ t. Consider an equilibrium in which the agent starts the project at time 0, he
continues with probability one at time t if he has succeeded by t or t < t, and otherwise he
follows a random stopping policy from time t on such that the market’s belief µ̂1t satisfies (23).
Let the market’s belief at t be µ0 if the agent has not started the project or has started and
not stopped by t and t < t, µ̂1t satisfying (23) if the agent has started and not stopped by t
and t ≥ t, and µs if the agent has started and stopped at s ∈ (0, t]. (Note that the belief upon
observing that the agent stops at a time t < t is off the equilibrium path; we show existence
when this belief satisfies µ̂0t = µt for all such t.)
The market’s on-the-equilibrium-path beliefs are consistent and the off-the-equilibrium-
path beliefs satisfy our belief monotonicity refinement. We now show that given the market’s
beliefs, the agent’s stopping plan is optimal. By construction, the agent is indifferent and
thus willing to follow a mixed strategy for t ≥ t in the absence of success. Note also that an
agent who has succeeded strictly prefers to continue with the project at time t if an agent who
has not succeeded weakly prefers to continue. Thus, all is left to be shown is that the agent
has incentives to start the project at time 0 and to continue with the project at t < t in the
absence of success.
For the start decision, note that the agent’s payoff if he does not start is µ0R/r. By
the martingale property of beliefs, this is also the agent’s expected reputation payoff if he
starts the project and follows the equilibrium strategy. Moreover, by Assumption 1, the agent
receives a strictly positive expected project payoff from any strategy that starts the project
and continues forever upon success. Hence, the agent strictly prefers to start and follow the
equilibrium strategy compared to not starting the project.
To show that it is optimal for the agent to continue at t < t absent success, it is sufficient to
show that the left-hand side of (22) is smaller than its right-hand side for t < t, or, equivalently,
Ψt := x+ µt(λG −R) + rR
∫ ∞
t
e−r(s−t)µ̂1sds ≥ 0. (24)
Suppose by contradiction that Ψt < 0 for some t < t. Note that by the previous claims,
Ψ0 > 0, and by definition of t, Ψt = 0. Therefore, if Ψt < 0 for t < t, there exist t
′ < t′′ < t
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such that Ψt′ = 0, Ψ˙t′ < 0, Ψt′′ < 0, and Ψ˙t′′ = 0. Differentiating (24) yields that for t < t,
Ψ˙t = −µt(1− µt)λG (λG −R)− rRµ0 + r2R
∫ ∞
t
e−r(s−t)µ̂1sds. (25)
Using (24) and (25), note that Ψt′ = 0, Ψ˙t′ < 0, Ψt′′ < 0, and Ψ˙t′′ = 0 imply
−µt′(1− µt′)λG (λG −R)− rRµ0 − r[x+ µt′(λG −R)] < 0, (26)
−µt′′(1− µt′′)λG (λG −R)− rRµ0 − r[x+ µt′′(λG −R)] > 0. (27)
However, given Assumption 1 and −x < R < −x/µ0, there is a unique value µt ∈ (0, µ0) that
solves (23) at t given µ̂1t = µ0, and this value is given by
µt =
λG + r −
√
λ2G(2r+λG−R)+λGr[4(µ0R+x)+r−2R]−r2R
λG−R
2λG
. (28)
Hence, we cannot have µt′ , µt′′ ∈ (µt, µ0). Contradiction.
Finally, we show that the equilibrium threshold time t satisfies t > tFB. Note that t is
uniquely pinned down by (9) and (28). To prove t > tFB, we verify that µt < µ
FB. The latter
inequality is immediate from comparing µt given in (28) and µ
FB given in (11), taking into
account that Assumption 1 and R < −x/µ0 imply λG > R.
Existence under R < −x. We consider an equilibrium analogous to that above, except
that the agent now stops with certainty by a finite time t if he has not succeeded by then.
Consistently, we specify beliefs for the market as those above but with µ̂1t = 1 for all t ≥ t.
Given this, the agent’s indifference condition (19) at t implies
R(1− µt) + x+ µtλGv = 0, (29)
and hence25
µt =
−(x+R)r
r(λG −R) + λG(λG + x) . (30)
The market’s on-the-equilibrium-path beliefs are consistent and the off-the-equilibrium-
path beliefs satisfy our belief monotonicity refinement. (Note that the belief upon observing
that the agent stops at a time t < t or t > t is off the equilibrium path; we show existence when
this belief satisfies µ̂0t = µt for all such t.) We now verify that given the market’s beliefs, the
25Equation (30) can equivalently be derived from (21) at t.
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agent’s stopping plan is optimal. Since the construction is analogous to that in the previous
case, all we need to verify is that the agent has no incentives to continue beyond t absent
success. Note that µt is decreasing over time and λG > R (by Assumption 1 and R < −x).
Thus, the left-hand side of (29) evaluated at t > t instead of t is strictly negative, implying
that the agent has indeed strict incentives not to continue beyond time t.
Finally, we show that the above conditions pin down µt and imply t > t
FB. Since (30)
uniquely pins down µt and (together with (9)) t, these can be substituted into equation (21)
at t = t (with µ̂1t = µ0) to solve for µt and t. Combining (9), (21), and (30) yields
0 = r
[
x+ µtλG +R(µ0 − µt)
]
+ µt(1− µt)λG(λG −R)
+µt(1− µt)λG
( −(x+R)r
(λG + x)(r + λG)
1− µt
µt
) r
λG λG(R + x)
r + λG
. (31)
To show that t > tFB, or equivalently µt < µ
FB, note that µt is continuous in R for all
R ≥ 0, and µt → µFB as R → 0. Moreover, in the limit as R → −x, µt coincides with (28),
which implies µt < µ
FB in this limit. Thus, suppose by contradiction that µt ≥ µFB for some
R ∈ (0,−x). Then there must exist R′ > 0 such that µt(R′) = µFB. More precisely, let g(R)
be the right-hand-side of (31) when µt = µ
FB, as a function of R. Algebraic manipulations
yield
g(R) :=
r
(
−x2 (λ2G + λG(µ0 + 1)R + 2rR)−Rx(λG + r)(2λGµ0 + λG + r)
−λGµ0R(λG + r)2 + λGx(λG + x)(R + x)
(
R+x
x
)r/λG − λGx3
)
λG(λG + r + x)2
.
As noted, g(0) = 0, and by the contradiction assumption, there exists R′ > 0 such that
g(R′) = 0. Furthermore, there must then exist 0 < R′′ < R′ such that g′(R′′) = 0, where
differentiating g(R) gives
g′(R) =
r
(
−x2(λGµ0 + λG + 2r)− x(λG + r)(2λGµ0 + λG + r)
−λGµ0(λG + r)2 + x(λG + r)(λG + x)
(
R+x
x
)r/λG
)
λG(λG + r + x)2
.
Note that given a set of parameters {µ0, λG, x, r}, there is a unique value R′′ for which g′(R′′) =
0, and it must satisfy g(R′′) < 0. Therefore, it must be that g′(R′) > 0. However, one can
verify that g(R′) = 0 implies g′(R′) < 0, yielding a contradiction.
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Existence under R > −x/µ0. Consider an equilibrium in which the agent starts the project
and never stops. Let the market’s beliefs be µ̂1t = µ0 and µ̂
0
t = µt for all t ≥ 0. (Note that the
belief upon observing that the agent stops at a time t > 0 is off the equilibrium path; we show
existence when this belief satisfies µ̂0t = µt for all such t.) The market’s on-the-equilibrium-path
beliefs are consistent and the off-the-equilibrium-path beliefs satisfy our belief monotonicity
refinement. We now show that given these beliefs, the agent always has strict incentives to
continue. That is, for all t ≥ 0,
µtR < x+ µtλG + µ0R.
Given R > −x/µ0, it is immediate that this condition always holds if R ≤ λG. Suppose
instead that R > λG. Since µt is decreasing over time, it suffices to show in this case that this
condition holds at time 0. By Assumption 1, this is indeed true.
Uniqueness. We show that the equilibrium is unique up to off-the-equilibrium-path beliefs
by proving the following claims.
Claim 1: An equilibrium in which the agent does not start the project at time 0 does not exist.
Proof of Claim 1: The proof of this claim is analogous to that of Claim 1 in the proof of
Proposition 1 and thus omitted.
Claim 2: Suppose there exists an equilibrium in which an agent who succeeds at t > 0 stops
with strictly positive probability after t. Then the agent stops with certainty at a time t′ ≥ t.
Proof of Claim 2: The proof of this claim is analogous to that of Claim 1 in the proof of
Lemma 1 and thus omitted.
Claim 3: There exists no equilibrium in which the agent stops with certainty at a time t′ > 0
by which he has succeeded.
Proof of Claim 3: The proof of this claim is analogous to that of Claim 2 in the proof of
Lemma 1 and thus omitted.
Claim 4: If R > −x/µ0, an equilibrium in which the agent stops with strictly positive probability
does not exist.
Proof of Claim 4: Our proof of existence under R > −x/µ0 shows that the agent has strict
incentives to continue at a time t if the market’s beliefs satisfy µ̂0t = µt and µ̂
1
s = µ0 for all
s ≥ t. It follows that the agent also has strict incentives to continue at t if µ̂0t ≤ µt and µ̂1s ≥ µ0
for all s ≥ t. By Claims 2 and 3 above, µ̂1s ≥ µ0 for all s ≥ 0. Hence, the agent can only be
willing to stop at a time t if µ̂0t > µt. However, by Claims 2 and 3 such a belief would not be
consistent. The claim follows.
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Claim 5: If R < −x/µ0, an equilibrium in which the agent never stops does not exist.
Proof of Claim 5: Suppose by contradiction that such an equilibrium exists. Then the market’s
belief conditional on the agent continuing is µ̂1t = µ0 for all t ≥ 0, and the agent must be willing
to continue rather than stop at all times. However, since the agent’s payoff from stopping is
weakly positive and µt → 0 as t→∞, this requires µ0R + x ≥ 0. Contradiction.
Claim 6: If R < −x, an equilibrium in which the agent continues with the project with strictly
positive probability absent success in the limit as t→∞ does not exist.
Proof of Claim 6: Suppose by contradiction that such an equilibrium exists. The agent must
be willing to continue rather than stop absent success in the limit as t→∞. Since the agent’s
payoff from stopping is weakly positive and µt → 0 as t → ∞, this requires that for some
µ̂1∞ ≤ 1, µ̂1∞R + x ≥ 0. This inequality however cannot be satisfied when R < −x.
Claim 7: In any equilibrium, the market’s belief conditional on the agent not having stopped,
µ̂1t , must be continuous.
Proof of Claim 7: Suppose by contradiction that an equilibrium in which µ̂1t is discontinuous
exists. Let tˆ be the earliest time at which this belief jumps. By Claims 2 and 3, µ̂1t is
weakly increasing and can only jump up. Suppose the belief jumps at tˆ from µ̂1tˆ− = µ̂
1− to
µ̂1tˆ+ = µ̂
1+ > µ̂1−. This requires the agent stopping with strictly positive probability, and by
consistency of beliefs and Claims 2 and 3, the market’s belief must satisfy µ̂0tˆ = µtˆ. Observe
also that the market’s belief satisfies µ̂0t ≥ µt for all t > 0, on and off the equilibrium path.
(That is, the most pessimistic belief at t corresponds to no success having arrived by t.)
Consider now the agent’s incentives. In the absence of success, the agent must be willing
to stop at tˆ rather than continue for an arbitrarily small amount of time dt and stop at tˆ+ dt
if no success is obtained over [tˆ, tˆ + dt]. Following similar steps to those used to derive (19),
taking dt to 0, this condition is
R
(
µ̂1+ − µtˆ
)
+ x+ µtˆλG
(
Vtˆ −
R
r
)
≤ 0. (32)
In the absence of success, the agent must also be willing to continue working over [tˆ − dt, tˆ]
and stop at tˆ if no success is obtained over [tˆ− dt, tˆ] rather than stop at tˆ− dt. This condition
can be written as
R
(
µ̂1− − µ̂0tˆ−
)
+ x+ µtˆλG
(
Vtˆ −
R
r
)
≥ 0. (33)
However, µ̂1+ > µ̂1− and µ̂0tˆ− ≥ µtˆ imply that (32) and (33) cannot be simultaneously satisfied.
Contradiction.
Claim 8: Suppose there exists an equilibrium in which, absent success, the agent stops with
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strictly positive probability by a time t <∞ and with zero probability at all times t > t. Then
µ̂1t = 1 for all t ≥ t.
Proof of Claim 8: Suppose the claim is not true. Then there exists an equilibrium in which
the agent quits with strictly positive probability absent success, he ceases quitting at a time
t <∞, and the market’s belief satisfies µ̂1t < 1 for some t ≥ t. Since the agent continues with
certainty after t if he has not stopped by then, the market’s belief µ̂1t must be constant at
some value, call it µ, for all t ≥ t. The agent’s indifference condition (19) at t yields
Rµ+ x+ µt
(
λG −R + λGλG + x
r
− λG(1− µ)R
r
)
= 0. (34)
Note that µ < 1 requires that an agent who has not succeeded by t be willing to continue
beyond this time. Since µt is decreasing over time, equation (34) implies that the agent is
willing to continue after t absent success if and only if the expression in parenthesis is negative.
That is, rearranging terms, the equilibrium requires
λG −R + λG
r
(λG −R + x+ µR) ≤ 0.
By Claim 4, the agent stopping with strictly positive probability in equilibrium requires R <
−x/µ0. Together with Assumption 1, this implies λG > R. Hence, the above inequality can
hold only if x+ µR < 0. However, if the parenthesis in (34) is negative and x+ µR < 0, (34)
cannot hold. Contradiction.
Claim 9: Suppose R > −x. There is no equilibrium in which, absent success, the agent stops
with strictly positive probability by a time t <∞ and with zero probability at all times t > t.
Proof of Claim 9: Suppose by contradiction that such an equilibrium exists. By Claim 4, the
agent stopping with strictly positive probability in equilibrium requires R < −x/µ0. Moreover,
as shown in Claim 8, if the agent’s quitting ceases by a time t <∞, the market’s belief must
be µ̂1t = 1 for all t ≥ t, and hence equation (30) must hold at t. However, if R > −x, this
equation yields µt < 0 (recall λG > R by Assumption 1 and R < −x/µ0), a contradiction.
Claim 10: Suppose there exists an equilibrium in which, absent success, the agent stops with
strictly positive probability over [t1, t2] and with zero probability over [t2, t3], for some 0 < t1 <
t2 < t3. Then the agent stops with zero probability at all t ≥ t2.
Proof of Claim 10: Suppose the claim is not true. Then there exists an equilibrium in which,
absent success, the agent stops with strictly positive probability over [t1, t2], with zero probabil-
ity over [t2, t3], and with strictly positive probability over [t3, t4], for some 0 < t1 < t2 < t3 < t4.
Let t > 0 be such that either t < ∞ and the probability of stopping absent success is zero
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at all t > t, or t = ∞. By construction, around both times t2 and t3, the agent must be
indifferent between stopping and continuing until t absent success. It follows that equation
(21) must hold at t2 and t3, where note that if t < ∞, then (30) uniquely pins down µt and
(together with (9)) t. However, since the agent stops with zero probability between t2 and t3,
we must have µ̂1t2 = µ̂
1
t3
≥ µ0. Given µt2 > µt3 , (21) cannot simultaneously hold at t2 and t3,
yielding a contradiction.
Claim 11: Up to off-the-equilibrium-path beliefs, the equilibrium is unique.
Proof of Claim 11: This follows from the claims above and the fact that the solutions for the
threshold times and µ̂1t shown in the proofs of existence above are unique.
B.2 Proof of Proposition 5
Preliminaries. Consider parameters with −x/µ0 > R > −x. As shown in Proposition 4,
the equilibrium features t ∈ (tFB,∞) and t = ∞, where t is given by (9) and (28), and
equations (22) and (23) hold at each t ≥ t. The market’s belief conditional on the agent not
having stopped is µ̂1t = µ0 for t < t, and, by equation (23), this belief can be written as a
function of µt independent of µ0 for t ≥ t. Note also that the posterior belief at which the
agent starts quitting, µt, is decreasing in µ0; this can be verified using (28).
The equilibrium therefore implies that, for any δ ≥ 0, µ̂1tFB(µ0)+δ is increasing and convex in
µ0. To see this, fix a prior µ
′
0 and a posterior belief µ
′ ≤ µFB. For any prior µ0 ≥ µ′0, consider
the market’s belief that corresponds to such a posterior, µ̂1(µ′, µ0). The construction implies
that if µ′ > µt(µ′0), µ̂
1(µ′, µ0) increases one-for-one as µ0 increases from µ
′
0. If µ
′ < µt(µ′0),
then as µ0 increases from µ
′
0, the belief µ̂
1(µ′, µ0) is invariant to µ0 up to µ0 = µ̂
1(µ′, µ′0), and
increases one-for-one with µ0 for µ0 > µ̂
1(µ′, µ′0). Figure 5 provides an illustration.
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The agent’s indi↵erence condition is now
R
 bµ1t   µt + x+ µt G✓Vt   Rr
◆
= 0. (1)
Since this must hold at each time at which the agent mixes, di↵erentiating this condition
yields b˙µ1tR = µ˙tR  µ˙t G✓Vt   Rr
◆
  µt GV˙t. (2)
We rewrite (2) by substituting with V˙t =  bµ1tR + r (Vt   v), v = 1 +  G+xr , µ˙t =
 µt(1  µt) G, and (1):
b˙µ1tR = [2 Gµt + r    G](bµ1tR + x) + µt (r +  G) ( G  R). (3)
Consider first the case in which R+x > 0 > µ0R+x, so that t is finite and t infinite.
The di↵erential equation has a closed-form solution:
bµ1t = ertKµt(1  µt)µ0(1  µ0)   1rR [µt( G  R)[r +  G(1  µt)] + rx] , (4)
where K is a constant given by the boundary conditions. Substituting (4) into Vt =
v +R
R1
t
e r(s t)bp1sds and integrating yields
Vt = v +
ertKRµt
 Gµ0(1  µ0)
  1
r
[x+ µt( G  R)] .
The value of t depends on µ0. Using the expression for Vt above, K and t can be
found by solving the following system:
bµ1t = µ0, (5)
R(µ0   µt) + x+ µt G
✓
Vt   R
r
◆
= 0. (6)
µ0 µ
0
0 µ
00
0
1
The agent’s indi↵erence condition is now
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◆
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◆
  µt GV˙t. (2)
We rewrite 2) by substituting with V˙t =  bµ1tR + r (Vt   v), v = 1 +  G+xr , µ˙t =
 µt(1  µt) G, and (1):
b˙µ1tR = [2 Gµt + r    G](bµ1tR + x) + µt (r +  G) ( G  R). (3)
Consider first e case in which R+x > 0 > µ0R+x, so that t is finite and t infinite.
The di↵erential equation has a closed-form solution:
bµ1t = ertKµt(1  µt)µ0(1  µ0)   1rR [µt( G  R)[r +  G(1  µt)] + rx] , (4)
where K is a constant give by the boundary conditions. Substituting (4) into Vt =
v +R
R1
t
e r(s t)bp1sds and integrating yields
Vt = v +
ertKRµt
 Gµ0(1  µ0)
  1
r
[x+ µt( G  R)] .
The value o t depends on µ0. Using th expression for Vt above, K and t can be
found by solving the following system:
bµ1t = µ0, (5)
R(µ0   µt) + x+ µt G
✓
Vt   R
r
◆
= 0. (6)
µ0 µ
0
0 µ
00
0
1
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= 0. (1)
Since this must hold at each time at which the agent mixes, di↵erentiating this condition
yields b˙µ1tR = µ˙tR  µ˙t G✓Vt   Rr
◆
  µt GV˙t. (2)
We rewrite (2) by substituting with V˙t =  bµ1tR + r (Vt   v), v = 1 +  G+xr , µ˙t =
 µt(1  µt) G, and (1):
b˙µ1tR = [2 Gµt + r    G](bµ1tR + x) + µt (r +  G) ( G  R). (3)
Consider first the case in which R+x > 0 > µ0R+x, so that t is finite and t infinite.
The di↵erential equation has a closed-form solution:
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v +R
R1
t
e r(s t)bp1sds and integrating yields
Vt = v +
ertKRµt
 Gµ0(1  µ0)
  1
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 µt(1  µt) G, nd (1):
b˙µ1tR = [2 Gµt + r    G](bµ1tR + x) + µt (r +  G) ( G  R). (3)
Consider first the case in which R+x > 0 > µ0R+x, so that t is finite and t infinite.
The di↵erential equation has a closed-form solution:
b1t = ertKµt(1  µt)µ0(1  µ0)   1rR [µt( G  R)[r +  G(1  µt)] + rx] , (4)
where K is a constant given by the boundary conditions. Substituting (4) into Vt =
v +R
R1
t
e r(s t)bp1sds and integrating yields
Vt = v +
ertKRµt
 Gµ0(1  µ0)
  1
r
[x+ µt( G  R)] .
The value f t depe s on µ0. Using the expression for Vt above, K and t can be
found by solving the following system:
bµ1t = µ0, (5)
R(µ0   µt) + x+ µt G
✓
Vt   R
r
◆
= 0. (6)
µ0 µ
0
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having stopped is bµ1t = µ0 for t < t, and, by equation (23), this belief can be written as a
function of µt independent of µ0 for t   t. Note also that the posterior belief at which the
agent starts quitting, µt, is decreasing in µ0; this can be verified using (28).
The equilibrium therefore implies that, for a y     0, bµ1tFB(µ0)+  is increas ng and convex in
µ0. To see this, fix a prior µ
0
0 and a posterior belief µ
0  µFB. For any prior µ0   µ00, consider
the market’s belief that corresponds to such a poste ior, bµ1(µ0, µ0). The construction implies
that if µ0 > µt(µ00), bµ1(µ0, µ0) increases one-for-one as µ0 increases from µ00. If µ0 < µt(µ00),
then as µ0 increases from µ
0
0, the belief bµ1(µ0, µ0) is invariant to µ0 up to µ0 = bµ1(µ0, µ00), and
increases one-for-one with µ0 for µ0 > bµ1(µ0, µ00). Figure 5 provides an illustration.
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  1
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found by solving the following system:
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0
0 µ
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= 0. (1)
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where K is a constant given by the boundary conditions. Substituting (4) into Vt =
v +R
R1
t
e r(s t)bp1sds and integrating yields
Vt = v +
ertKRµt
 Gµ0(1  µ0)
  1
r
[x+ µt( G  R)] .
The value of t depends on µ0. Using the expr ssion for Vt above, K and t can be
found by solving the following system:
bµ1t = µ0, (5)
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= 0. (6)
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0
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The agent’s indi↵erence condition is now
R
 bµ1t   µt + x+ µt G✓Vt   Rr
◆
= 0. (1)
Since this must hold at each time at which the agent mixes, di↵erentiating this condition
yields b˙µ1tR = µ˙tR  µ˙t G✓Vt   Rr
◆
  µt GV˙t. (2)
We rewrite (2) by substituting with V˙t =  bµ1tR + r (Vt   v), v = 1 +  G+xr , µ˙t =
 µt(1  µt) G, and (1):
b˙µ1tR = [2 Gµt + r    G](bµ1tR + x) + µt (r +  G) ( G  R). (3)
Consider first the case in which R+x > 0 > µ0R+x, so that t is finite and t infinite.
The di↵erential equation has a closed-form solution:
bµ1t = ertKµt(1  µt)µ0(1  µ0)   1rR [µt( G  R)[r +  G(1  µt)] + rx] , (4)
where K is a constant given by the boundary conditions. Substituting (4) into Vt =
v +R
R1
t
e r(s t)bp1sds and integrating yields
Vt = v +
ertKRµt
 Gµ0(1  µ0)
  1
r
[x+ µt( G  R)] .
The value of t depends on µ0. Using the expression for Vt above, K and t can be
found by solving the following system:
bµ1t = µ0, (5)
R(µ0   µt) + x+ µt G
✓
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µ0 µ
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The agent’s indi↵erence condition is now
R
 bµ1t   µt + x+ µt G✓Vt   Rr
◆
= 0. (1)
Since his must hold a each time at which the agent mixes, di↵erentiating this c n iti n
yields b˙µ1tR = µ˙tR  µ˙t G✓Vt   Rr
◆
  µt GV˙t. (2)
We rewrite (2) by substituting with V˙t =  bµ1tR + r (Vt   v), v = 1 +  G+xr , µ˙t =
 µt(1  µt) G, and (1):
b˙µ1tR = [2 Gµt + r    G](bµ1tR + x) + µt (r +  G) ( G  R). (3)
Consider first the case in which R+x > 0 > µ0R+x, so that t is finite and t infinite.
The di↵erential equation has a closed-form solution:
bµ1t = ertKµt(1  µt)µ0(1  µ0)   1R [µt( G  R)[r +  G(1  µt)] + rx] , (4)
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v +R
R1
t
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Vt = v +
ertKRµt
 Gµ0(1  µ0)
  1
r
[x+ µt( G  R)] .
Th value of t depends on µ0. Usi g the expression for Vt above, K and t can be
found by solving the following system:
bµ1t = µ0, (5)
R(µ0   µt) + x+ µt G
✓
Vt   R
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The agent’s indi↵erence condition is now
R
 bµ1t   µt + x+ µt G✓Vt   Rr
◆
= 0. (1)
Since this must hold at each time at which the agent mixes, di↵erentiating this condition
yields b˙µ1tR = µ˙tR  µ˙t G✓Vt   Rr
◆
  µt GV˙t. (2)
We rewrite (2) by substituting with V˙t =  bµ1tR + r (Vt   v), v = 1 +  G+xr , µ˙t =
 µt(1  µt) G, and (1):
b˙µ1tR = [2 Gµt + r    G](bµ1tR + x) + µt (r +  G) ( G  R). (3)
Consider first the case in which R+x > 0 > µ0R+x, so that t is fi it and t i finite.
The di↵erential equation has a closed-form solution:
bµ1t = ertKµt(1 µt)µ0(1 µ0)   1rR [µt( G  R)[r +  G(1  µt)] + rx] , (4)
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v +R
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e r(s t)bp1sds and integ at ng y lds
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ertKRµt
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The value of t dep nds on 0. Using th expression for Vt above, K and t can be
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bµ1t = µ0, (5)
R(µ0   µt) + x+ µt G
✓
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The agent’s indi↵erence condition is now
R
 bµ1t   µt + x+ µt G✓Vt   Rr
◆
= 0. (1)
Since this must hold at each time at which the agent mixes, di↵erentiating this condition
yields b˙µ1tR = µ˙tR  µ˙t G✓Vt   Rr
◆
  µt GV˙t. (2)
We rewrite (2) by substituting with V˙t =  bµ1tR + r (Vt   v), v = 1 +  G+xr , µ˙t =
 µt(1  µt) G, and (1):
b˙µ1tR = [2 µt + r    G](bµ1tR + x) + µt (r +  G) ( G  R). (3)
Consider first the case n which R+x > 0 > µ0R+x, so hat is fin te a i fin te.
The di↵erential equation has a closed-form solution:
bµ1t = ertKµt(1 µt)µ0(1  µ0)   1rR [µt( G  R [r +  G(1  µt)] + rx] , (4)
wh re K is a consta t given by the boundary conditions. Substituting (4) into Vt =
v +R
R1
t
e r(s t)bp1sds and integrating yield
Vt = v +
er KRµt
 Gµ0(1  µ0)
  1
r
[x+ µ ( G  R)] .
The value of t depends on µ0. Using the expression for Vt above, K and t can be
fou d by solv ng the following system:
bµ1t = µ0, (5)
R(µ0   µt) + x+ µt G
✓
Vt   R
r
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Figure 5: Market’s belief conditional on the agent not having stopped, as a function of µ0 for
a fixed posterior belief µ0. The left graph corresponds to µ0 > µt(µ00), where µ
0
0 is the lowest prior
considered in the figure. The right graph corresponds to µ0 < µt(µ00).
Hence, for any     0, we have
@bµ1tFB(µ0)+ 
@µ0
  0, @
2bµ1tFB(µ0)+ 
@µ20
  0. (35)
Let ⌘tFB(µ0)+  denote the probability that the agent has not succeeded by time t
FB(µ0)+  
conditional on the agent continuing until this time:
⌘tFB(µ0)+  =
Pr(did not succeed & cont)tFB(µ0)+ 
Pr(cont)tFB(µ0)+ 
.
The market’s belief satisfies
bµ1tFB(µ0)+  = 1  ⌘tFB(µ0)+  + ⌘tFB(µ0)+  µtFB(µ0)+ . (36)
41
having s opped is bµ1t = µ0 for < t, and, by equation (23), this belief can be written as a
func ion of µt independent f µ0 for t   t. Not also that the posterior belief at which the
agent sta ts quitting, µt, is decreasing in 0; this can be verified using (28).
The equili rium therefore implies tha , for any     0, bµ1tFB(µ0)+  is increasing and convex in
µ0. To see this, fix a prior µ
0
0 and a p steri r bel ef µ
0  µFB. For any prior µ0   µ00, consider
the market’s belief that corresponds to such a poste ior, bµ1(µ0, µ0). The construction implies
that if µ0 > µt(µ00), bµ1(µ0, µ0) increases one-for-one as µ0 incr ases from µ00. If µ0 < µt(µ00),
then as µ0 increases from µ
0
0, the belief bµ1(µ0 µ0) is invariant to µ0 up to µ0 = bµ1(µ0, µ00), and
increases on -for- ne with µ0 for µ0 > bµ1(µ0, µ00). Figure 5 provides an illustration.
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The agent’s indi↵erence condition is now
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◆
  µt GV˙t. (2)
We rewrite (2) by subst uting with V˙t =  bµ1tR + r (Vt   v), v = 1 +  G+xr , µ˙t =
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 Gµ0(1  µ0)
  1
r
[x+ µt( G  R)] .
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µ0 µ
0
0 µ
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Figure 5: Market’s belief conditio al the agent not having stopped, as a function of µ0 for
a fixed posterior belief µ0. The left graph corresponds to µ0 > µt(µ00), where µ
0
0 is the lowest prior
consi ered in the figure. The right graph corresponds to µ0 < µt(µ00).
Hence, for any     0, we have
@bµ1tFB(µ0)+ 
@µ0
  0, @
2bµ1tFB(µ0)+ 
@µ20
  0. (35)
Let ⌘tFB(µ0)+  denote th probability that the agent has not succeeded by time t
FB(µ0)+  
conditional on the agent continuing until this time:
⌘tFB(µ0)+  =
Pr(did not succeed & cont)tFB(µ0)+ 
Pr(cont)tFB(µ0)+ 
.
The market’s belief satisfies
bµ1tFB(µ0)+  = 1  ⌘tFB(µ0)+  + ⌘tFB(µ0)+  µtFB(µ0)+ . (36)
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Figure 5: Market’s belief conditional on the agent no having stopped, as a function of µ0 for
a fixed posterior belief µ′. The left graph corresponds to µ′ > µt(µ′0), where µ
′
0 is the lowest prior
considered in the figure. The right graph corresponds to µ′ < µt(µ′0).
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Hence, for any δ ≥ 0, we have
∂µ̂1tFB(µ0)+δ
∂µ0
≥ 0, ∂
2µ̂1tFB(µ0)+δ
∂µ20
≥ 0. (35)
Let ηtFB(µ0)+δ denote the probability that the agent has not succeeded by time t
FB(µ0) + δ
conditional on the agent continuing until this time:
ηtFB(µ0)+δ =
Pr(did not succeed & cont)tFB(µ0)+δ
Pr(cont)tFB(µ0)+δ
.
The market’s belief satisfies
µ̂1tFB(µ0)+δ = 1− ηtFB(µ0)+δ + ηtFB(µ0)+δ µtFB(µ0)+δ. (36)
Since µtFB(µ0)+δ is independent of µ0, differentiating (36) yields
−∂µ̂
1
tFB(µ0)+δ
∂µ0
=
∂ηtFB(µ0)+δ
∂µ0
(1− µtFB(µ0)+δ),
−∂
2µ̂1tFB(µ0)+δ
∂µ20
=
∂2ηtFB(µ0)+δ
∂µ20
(1− µtFB(µ0)+δ).
Combining this with (35), we obtain that for any δ ≥ 0,
∂ηtFB(µ0)+δ
∂µ0
≤ 0, ∂
2ηtFB(µ0)+δ
∂µ20
≤ 0. (37)
Effects of µ0 on welfare. We show that welfare is increasing in µ0. Since first-best welfare
is increasing in µ0, it suffices to show that flow welfare at any time t > t
FB(µ0) is increasing
in µ0. For any δ > 0, welfare at time t
FB(µ0) + δ is
Pr(succeeded & cont)tFB(µ0)+δ (λG + x)
+ Pr(did not succeed & cont)tFB(µ0)+δ (µtFB(µ0)+δλG + x). (38)
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Suppose for the purpose of contradiction that for some δ > 0, (38) is decreasing in µ0, that is
(using the fact that µtFB(µ0)+δ is independent of µ0),
∂ Pr(succeeded & cont)tFB(µ0)+δ
∂µ0
(λG + x)
+
∂ Pr(did not succeed & cont)tFB(µ0)+δ
∂µ0
(µtFB(µ0)+δλG + x) < 0. (39)
We can rewrite (39) as
∂ Pr(cont)tFB(µ0)+δ
∂µ0
(λG+x) <
∂ Pr(did not succeed & cont)tFB(µ0)+δ
∂µ0
λG(1−µtFB(µ0)+δ). (40)
Note that the derivative on the left-hand side is positive.26 Moreover, Assumption 1 implies
(λG + x)/λG > 1− µ0. Hence, (40) implies
∂ Pr(cont)tFB(µ0)+δ
∂µ0
(1− µ0) <
∂ Pr(did not succeed & cont)tFB(µ0)+δ
∂µ0
(1− µtFB(µ0)+δ).
Substituting with 1− µtFB(µ0)+δ =
1−µ0
µ0e
−λG(tFB(µ0)+δ)+1−µ0
, this can be rewritten as
∂ Pr(cont)tFB(µ0)+δ
∂µ0
(
µ0e
−λG(tFB(µ0)+δ) + 1− µ0
)
<
∂ Pr(did not succeed & cont)tFB(µ0)+δ
∂µ0
.
(41)
Finally, note that ηtFB(µ0)+δ ≤ µ0e−λG(t
FB(µ0)+δ) + 1− µ0, as an agent who has succeeded does
not stop. Thus, (41) implies
∂ Pr(cont)tFB(µ0)+δ
∂µ0
ηtFB(µ0)+δ <
∂ Pr(did not succeed & cont)tFB(µ0)+δ
∂µ0
. (42)
We now show that (42) contradicts (37), namely the fact that ηtFB(µ0)+δ is decreasing in
26To see why, take µ′0 > µ
′′
0 . It is clear that Pr(cont)tFB(µ′0)+δ ≥ Pr(cont)tFB(µ′′0 )+δ for tFB(µ′0) + δ ≤ t(µ′0),
as µt is decreasing in µ0. Moreover, since ηtFB(µ′0)+δ = ηtFB(µ′′0 )+δ for t
FB(µ′0) + δ ≥ t(µ′0), the percentage
change over time in Pr(cont)tFB(µ0)+δ must be the same under µ
′
0 and µ
′′
0 at all t
FB(µ′0)+δ ≥ t(µ′0), and hence
we also obtain Pr(cont)tFB(µ′0)+δ ≥ Pr(cont)tFB(µ′′0 )+δ for all those times.
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µ0. The derivative of ηtFB(µ0)+δ with respect to µ0 being negative implies
∂ Pr(did not succeed & cont)tFB(µ0)+δ
∂µ0
Pr(cont)tFB(µ0)+δ
− ∂ Pr(cont)tFB(µ0)+δ
∂µ0
Pr(did not succeed & cont)tFB(µ0)+δ ≤ 0,
or, equivalently,
∂ Pr(did not succeed & cont)tFB(µ0)+δ
∂µ0
≤ ∂ Pr(cont)tFB(µ0)+δ
∂µ0
ηtFB(µ0)+δ.
This inequality is in contradiction with (42).
Effects of information on welfare. We show that the welfare effects of information are
positive. Consider a public signal at time 0 that refines µ0 while satisfying −x/µ0 > R and
Assumption 1 for all of its realizations. Since first-best welfare increases with information, it
suffices to show that flow welfare at any time t > tFB(µ0) is convex in µ0. Note that
∂ηtFB(µ0)+δ
∂µ0
=
{
∂ Pr(did not succeed & cont)tFB(µ0)+δ
∂µ0
− ∂ Pr(cont)tFB(µ0)+δ
∂µ0
ηtFB(µ0)+δ
}
1
Pr(cont)tFB(µ0)+δ
.
By (37),
∂2η
tFB(µ0)+δ
∂µ20
≤ 0. Hence,
0 ≥
{
∂2 Pr(did not succeed & cont)tFB(µ0)+δ
∂µ20
− ∂
2 Pr(cont)tFB(µ0)+δ
∂µ20
ηtFB(µ0)+δ −
∂ Pr(cont)tFB(µ0)+δ
∂µ0
∂ηtFB(µ0)+δ
∂µ0
}
Pr(cont)tFB(µ0)+δ
− ∂ Pr(cont)tFB(µ0)+δ
∂µ0
∂ηtFB(µ0)+δ
∂µ0
Pr(cont)tFB(µ0)+δ.
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Equivalently,
2
∂ Pr(cont)tFB(µ0)+δ
∂µ0
∂ηtFB(µ0)+δ
∂µ0
≥
{
∂2 Pr(did not succeed & cont)tFB(µ0)+δ
∂µ20
− ∂
2 Pr(cont)tFB(µ0)+δ
∂µ20
ηtFB(µ0)+δ
}
.
Since
∂ Pr(cont)
tFB(µ0)+δ
∂µ0
≥ 0 and ∂ηtFB(µ0)+δ
∂µ0
≤ 0, the left-hand side is negative, which implies
∂2 Pr(did not succeed & cont)tFB(µ0)+δ
∂µ20
≤ ∂
2 Pr(cont)tFB(µ0)+δ
∂µ20
ηtFB(µ0)+δ. (43)
If the derivative on the left-hand side of (43) is negative, the distortion relative to first
best is concave in µ0 and thus welfare is convex in µ0.
Suppose instead that the derivative on the left-hand side of (43) is strictly positive. Then
this equation implies
∂2 Pr(cont)
tFB(µ0)+δ
∂µ20
> 0. Suppose for the purpose of contradiction that
welfare is concave in µ0, that is:
∂2 Pr(succeeded & cont)tFB(µ0)+δ
∂µ20
(λG + x)
+
∂2 Pr(did not succeed & cont)tFB(µ0)+δ
∂µ20
(µtFB(µ0)+δλG + x) < 0. (44)
We can rewrite (44) as
∂2 Pr(cont)tFB(µ0)+δ
∂µ20
(λG + x) <
∂2 Pr(did not succeed & cont)tFB(µ0)+δ
∂2µ0
λG(1− µtFB(µ0)+δ).
(45)
Recall that we are considering the case in which the derivative on the left-hand side is strictly
positive. Hence, we can follow analogous steps to those in (40)-(42) to show that (45) implies
∂2 Pr(cont)tFB(µ0)+δ
∂µ20
ηtFB(µ0)+δ <
∂2 Pr(did not succeed & cont)tFB(µ0)+δ
∂µ20
. (46)
This inequality is in contradiction with (43).
Finally, consider a fully informative signal that reveals at time 0 whether the project is
good or bad. Arguments analogous to those in the proof of Proposition 3 imply that this
signal eliminates distortions and increases welfare.
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Effects of µ0 and information on distortion relative to first best. We show by example
that an increase in the prior µ0 and imperfect information that refines µ0 can reduce the
distortion relative to first best. To do this, we compute numerically the equilibrium for different
prior beliefs.
We approximate the continuous time outcome by taking a discrete time model with periods
of small length. Specifically, discretize time in periods of dt length, so t ∈ {0, dt, 2dt, ...}, and
assume tFB and t are on the grid (i.e., tFB/dt and t/dt are integers). The probability that a
good project succeeds over a period of length dt is λGdt. The probability that a good project
succeeds before time t is 1− (1− λGdt) tdt .
Recall that the agent continues with certainty until time t, and we can compute the market’s
belief µ̂1t for each time t ≥ t using equation (23). Using µ̂1t , we can then solve for the probability
with which the agent continues at each time. Call γtdt the probability that the agent stops
over [t, t+ dt] absent success. Then
µ̂1t+dt =
µ0
[
1− (1− λGdt) tdt
]
+ µ0(1− λGdt)
t
dt (1− γtdt)
µ0
[
1− (1− λGdt) tdt
]
+ (µ0(1− λGdt)
t
dt + 1− µ0)(1− γtdt)
.
Similarly, call γt+dtdt the probability that the agent stops over [t + dt, t + 2dt] absent
success. The probability that an agent who has a bad project will stay until time t + 2dt is
(1 − γtdt)(1 − γt+dtdt). The probability that an agent who has a good project and had not
succeeded by time t will stay until t+ 2dt is (1− γtdt)[λGdt+ (1− λGdt)(1− γt+dtdt)]. Thus,
µ̂1t+2dt =
µ0
[
1− (1− λGdt) tdt
]
+ µ0(1− λGdt)
t
dt (1− γtdt)[λGdt+ (1− λGdt)(1− γt+dtdt)][
µ0
[
1− (1− λGdt) tdt
]
+ µ0(1− λGdt)
t
dt (1− γ1dt)[λGdt+ (1− λGdt)(1− γt+dtdt)]
+(1− µ0)(1− γtdt)(1− γt+dtdt)
] .
We perform analogous computations for t + 3dt, t + 4dt, and so on. Equilibrium welfare
can then be written as
µ0
t−dt∑
t=0
(1− rdt) tdt (1− λGdt) tdt (xdt+ λGdt v) + (1− µ0)
t−dt∑
t=0
(1− rdt) tdtxdt
+µ0
∞∑
t=t
(1− rdt) tdt (1− λGdt) tdtΠts=t(1− γsdt)(xdt+ λGdt v)
+(1− µ0)
∞∑
t=t
(1− rdt) tdtΠts=t(1− γsdt)xdt,
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where Πts=t(1− γsdt) = (1− γtdt)(1− γt+dtdt)(1− γt+2dtdt) . . . (1− γt+ndtdt) for t + ndt = t.
We take a large time T (on the grid) such that γt is virtually zero for t > T and approximate
welfare by computing
S = µ0
t−dt∑
t=0
(1− rdt) tdt (1− λGdt) tdt (xdt+ λGdt v) + (1− µ0)
t−dt∑
t=0
(1− rdt) tdtxdt
+µ0
T−dt∑
t=t
(1− rdt) tdt (1− λGdt) tdtΠts=t(1− γsdt)(xdt+ λGdt v)
+(1− µ0)
T−dt∑
t=t
(1− rdt) tdtΠts=t(1− γsdt)xdt
+(1− rdt) TdtΠTs=t(1− γsdt)
[
µ0(1− λGdt)
T
dt
(x+ λGv)
r + λG − rλGdt + (1− µ0)
x
r
]
.
Finally, we compute first-best welfare,
SFB = µ0
tFB∑
t=0
(1− rdt) tdt (1− λGdt) tdt (xdt+ λGdt v) + (1− µ0)
tFB∑
t=0
(1− rdt) tdtxdt,
where v = 1 + x+λG
r
, and we compute the distortion, D = SFB − S.
Consider the parameters reported in the example of Figure 3, with a prior µ0 = 0.5, and
take periods of length dt = 0.001. We verify that γt becomes virtually zero after a large enough
number of periods; accordingly, we compute equilibrium welfare S above for T = 3, 000. Let
µ′0 = 0.75 and µ
′′
0 = 0.25, and denote by D(µ0) the distortion given a prior belief µ0. We
obtain D(µ0) = 0.0426, D(µ
′
0) = 0.0409, and D(µ
′′
0) = 0.0286. Hence, an increase in the prior
from µ0 to µ
′
0 reduces the distortion relative to first best. Furthermore, take a binary public
signal that increases the prior to µ′0 when the realization is high and decreases the prior to
µ′′0 when the realization is low, with each realization occurring with equal probability. Since
D(µ0) > 0.5D(µ
′
0) + 0.5D(µ
′′
0), releasing this public signal at time 0 reduces the distortion
relative to first best.
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